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SEC IN-HOUSE TRIBUNALS: A CALL FOR REFORM
DREW THORNLEY* AND JUSTIN BLOUNT**
INTRODUCTION
IIN the aftermath of the 1929 crash of the stock market and during theheight of the Great Depression, the federal government took steps to
strengthen U.S. securities laws.1  To that end, via the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the U.S. Congress (Congress) created the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), whose “mission [is] to protect investors,
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital forma-
tion.”2  As “the primary overseer and regulator of the U.S. securities mar-
kets,” the SEC has the power to bring enforcement actions against parties
it believes to be in violation of the nation’s securities laws.3
The SEC has pursued such enforcement actions via two media: fed-
eral courts and the SEC’s in-house administrative tribunals (tribunals).4
Pursuant to expanded authority granted by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),5 the SEC has in-
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Rusche College of Business at Stephen
F. Austin State University, B.A., Economics, The University of Alabama; J.D.,
Harvard Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, Rusche College of Business at
Stephen F. Austin State University, B.B.A., Finance, Southwestern Oklahoma State
University; J.D., Baylor Law School; M.B.A., The University of Texas at Austin.
1. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78u-2 (2012).
2. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml#create [https://perma.cc/AX72-RK3P] (last visited Jan. 20,
2017).
3. See id. (“The SEC oversees the key participants in the securities world, in-
cluding securities exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors,
and mutual funds.  Here the SEC is concerned primarily with promoting the dis-
closure of important market-related information, maintaining fair dealing, and
protecting against fraud.  Crucial to the SEC’s effectiveness in each of these areas
is its enforcement authority.  Each year the SEC brings hundreds of civil enforce-
ment actions against individuals and companies for violation of the securities
laws.”).
4. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Litigation Releases, https://www.sec.gov/liti-
gation/litreleases.shtml [https://perma.cc/93CT-6X34] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017)
(listing enforcement actions brought by SEC in federal court); see also U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, Administrative Proceedings, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/ad-
min.shtml [https://perma.cc/VT3V-V3PB] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (listing ad-
ministrative actions taken by SEC outside of federal court system, including
administrative tribunals).
5. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 77h–1 to allow SEC to seek monetary penalties in cease and
desist actions filed in administrative proceedings).
(261)
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creased its use of enforcement actions via tribunals where, of late, it has a
higher success rate than in such actions brought in federal courts.6
Several recent lawsuits have challenged the SEC’s use of its tribunals.
Specifically, plaintiffs have asserted chiefly that (1) defendants are af-
forded fewer procedural legal protections in tribunals than in federal
courts, in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s guarantees of due process,
(2) the Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) who preside over the tribunals’
evidentiary hearings are biased toward the SEC, and (3) the method of
appointing the ALJs who sit on the tribunals violates the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Appointments Clause, infringing on the doctrine of separation of
powers, upon which our country was founded.7  Coincident with this
ongoing litigation, opposition to the tribunals is growing elsewhere, with
public calls from businesses, Congress, and others for reform of the SEC’s
system of administrative enforcement.8
This Article aims to provide an in-depth look at the issues being raised
with respect to SEC tribunals and provide recommendations for reform to
rectify these problems.  Part I explores the history of the doctrine of sepa-
ration of governmental powers and examines the history of the U.S. judi-
cial branch and the distinction between courts created per Article III of
the U.S. Constitution (Article III courts) and courts created per Article I
of the U.S. Constitution (non-Article III courts), including U.S. adminis-
trative tribunals and SEC tribunals, specifically.  Part II discusses and ana-
lyzes the current opposition to the SEC’s tribunals and argues that even if
the legal claims being made are successful, the underlying problems will
6. See Gretchen Morgenson, Crying Foul on Plans to Expand the S.E.C.’s In-House
Court System, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/
business/secs-in-house-justice-raises-questions.html [https://perma.cc/EZS6-
TQ66] (“So far this year, the S.E.C. has a better record in federal court . . . and
over the longer term the S.E.C. wins more often in its home courts.  From 2012
through June 25, 2015, it succeeded on average in 92.7 percent of matters heard
by its internal judges, versus a 77 percent success rate in federal courts.  Against
individuals, its success rate over the period is 84.7 percent in cases heard adminis-
tratively, 76 percent in district courts.”).
7. See Rebecca L. Dandy, SEC Administrative Proceedings Under Constitutional
Scrutiny, VEDDER PRICE (Aug. 2015), http://www.vedderprice.com/sec-administra-
tive-proceedings-under-constitutional-scrutiny/ [https://perma.cc/GB2D-V7PV]
(discussing due process, equal protection, and appointments clause challenges be-
ing made to SEC administrative proceedings).  Another constitutional challenge
that has been brought against these SEC tribunals is the assertion that they violate
the Seventh Amendment’s right to a trial by jury. See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d
1297, 1313–16 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir.
2016) (discussing plaintiff’s Seventh Amendment claim but ruling that plaintiff
would be unable to establish likelihood of success on merits given Supreme Court
precedent holding that Congress can allow for adjudication of public rights claims
in administrative hearings without juries).  However, this challenge has not been
made as commonly as the other challenges referenced, has largely been unsuccess-
ful, and presents its own unique challenges that are outside the scope of this Arti-
cle given the Supreme Court precedents in this area. See id.  Thus, this Article will
focus on the more commonly raised issues referenced.
8. See infra Part II.
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remain.  Part III provides recommendations for remedying these
problems by structuring a system of Article III courts to replace the SEC’s
administrative tribunals.
I. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
Central to this Article is the belief that the SEC’s current system of
administrative enforcement violates our Founding Fathers’ idea of sepa-
rate branches of government, each with distinct functions and powers that
should not be infringed upon by the other branches.  It is, thus, important
to understand the need for separation of governmental powers and the
structure and function of the judicial branch that our Founding Fathers
put in place when they formed our country.
A. Separation of Powers
Though the phrase is not found in the U.S. Constitution, “separation
of powers” was an important principle in the formation of our nation and
remains a fundamental aspect of our national and state governments.9
Our Founding Fathers believed in separate branches of government, each
with specific powers and built-in protections against certain encroach-
ments between and among branches.10
The idea of separation of powers predates the forming of our nation,
and our founders built our government on principles espoused by many
who came before them.  Indeed, prior to the writing and ratification of
the Constitution, the concept of separation of powers was imbedded in the
constitutions and charters of various American colonies, which listed spe-
cific branches of government and their respective powers.11  Going back
9. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (discussing non-
delegation doctrine, which prevents delegation of legislative power to another
branch, and noting that it is “rooted in the principle of separation of powers that
underlies our tripartite system of Government”).
10. See id. at 380 (“This Court consistently has given voice to, and has reaf-
firmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our
political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate
Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.” (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986))).
11. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I (1777) (“The legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers
properly belonging to the other.”); MD. CONST. art. VI (1776) (“That the legisla-
tive, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate
and distinct from each other.”); MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXX (1780) (“In the gov-
ernment of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exer-
cise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a
government of laws and not of men.”); N.J. CONST. art. XX (1776) (“That the
legislative department of this government may, as much as possible, be preserved
from all suspicion of corruption, none of the Judges of the Supreme or other
Courts, Sheriffs, or any other person or persons possessed of any post of profit
under the government, other than Justices of the Peace, shall be entitled to a seat
3
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further, prior to the days of the American colonies, the idea of separation
of powers was present in the writings of several influential philosophers
and commentators, such as John Locke and Montesquieu, and their views,
as well as the views of others, informed the thoughts of those who drafted
the Constitution.
Though he focused on two functions of government—legislative and
executive—John Locke espoused the position that those who create laws
should not be those who execute them.12  Montesquieu, in De l’esprit des
loix (The Spirit of the Laws), discussed at length the importance of separate,
distinct functions of government and the restraints placed on each by the
others, drawing references to such balance of governmental powers pre-
sent in the Roman Empire and the imbalance of powers in certain other
governments.13  He noted that every government consists of three basic
powers: the legislative, executive, and judicial.14  Montesquieu stressed
that it is critical to liberty for these powers to be separated into distinct
bodies of the government.15  This need for separation of powers extends
to the judicial power, and Montesquieu stressed the crucial importance of
an independent judiciary.16  These and other views helped shape the tri-
in the Assembly . . . .”); N.C. CONST. art. IV (1776) (“That the legislative, executive,
and supreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever separate and dis-
tinct from each other.”); PA. CONST. § 47 (1776) (“In order that the freedom of
the commonwealth may be preserved inviolate forever, there shall be chosen by
ballot by the freemen in each city and county respectively . . . two persons in each
city and county of this state, to be called the Council of Censors . . . whose duty it
shall be to enquire whether the constitution has been preserved inviolate in every
part. . . .”); VA. CONST. (1776) (“The legislative, executive, and judiciary depart-
ment, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly
belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one
of them, at the same time . . . .”).
12. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 143, 144, 150, 159
(Peter Laslett ed., New Am. Library 1965) (1689) (“And because it may be too
great a temptation to humane frailty apt to grasp at Power, for the same Persons
who have the Power of making Laws, to have also in their hands the power to
execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from Obedience to the Laws
they make, and suit the Law, both in its making and execution, to their own private
advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the Com-
munity, contrary to the end of Society and Government . . . .”).
13. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT & BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES
LOIX 73 (Thomas Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2001) (1748) (discussing Roman
philosopher Cicero).
14. See id. at 173 (“In every government there are three sorts of power: the
legislative; the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations; and
the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law . . . .  The latter we
shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive power of the
state.”).
15. See id. (“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because appre-
hensions may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws,
to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”).
16. See id. (“Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive.  Were it joined with the legislative, the life and
liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would be
4
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partite system of government that our Founding Fathers created and that
remains today.
The Supreme Court of the United States has also stressed the vital
importance of separation of powers and, specifically, an independent judi-
ciary, writing in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.17
that “our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental princi-
ple—that the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ must be reposed in an
independent Judiciary.  It commands that the independence of the Judici-
ary be jealously guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for
that independence.”18  Similar to Montesquieu, the Supreme Court has
made other strong statements about the necessity of separation of powers
and an independent judiciary to a properly functioning government.19
These time-honored principles of good governance are as important and
as true today as they were at the time they were written.
B. The U.S. Judicial Branch: Article III Courts and Judicial Power
Clearly, the doctrine of separation of powers has a rich tradition in
both European and American political thought and governance, and a
fundamental aspect of separation of powers is the independence of the
judiciary.20  Our Founding Fathers recognized this principle and created
an independent judicial branch via Article III of the Constitution.21
Section I of Article III establishes that the power to carry out the judi-
cial role rests with the judicial branch: “The judicial Power of the United
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”22  Thus, the
Constitution allowed for the creation of one supreme-in-power court—the
then the legislator.  Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with violence and oppression.”).
17. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
18. Id. at 60.
19. See e.g., id. at 57 (“Basic to the constitutional structure established by the
Framers was their recognition that ‘[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.’  To ensure against such tyranny, the Framers provided that
the Federal Government would consist of three distinct Branches . . . .” (alteration
in original) (citation omitted)); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1980)
(“A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and Legislature is essential if there
is a right to have claims decided by judges who are free from potential domination
by other branches of government.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)
(“The Framers regarded the checks and balances that they had built into the tri-
partite Federal Government as a self-executing safeguard against the encroach-
ment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.”), superseded by
statute as stated in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), over-
ruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
20. See supra Part I.A.
21. See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing judicial branch of U.S. government).
22. See id. § 1.
5
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Supreme Court23—and empowered Congress to create lower courts as it
saw fit.24  These courts collectively constitute the federal judiciary and are
referred to here as Article III courts.  Any courts or tribunals established
outside of Congress’s Article III authority, including the SEC’s in-house
tribunals that are the subject of this Article, are referred to here as non-
Article III courts.25
The federal courts currently established pursuant to Article III are as
follows: the Supreme Court,26 U.S. Courts of Appeals,27 U.S. District
Courts,28 and the U.S. Court of International Trade.29  Defining charac-
teristics of Article III courts are that their judges and justices (1) are ap-
pointed in compliance with the Appointments Clause30 and (2) enjoy
tenure and salary protection, which means they can hold their position for
life, barring impeachment, and their salary will not be reduced while in
23. See id.; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (creating
Supreme Court pursuant to constitutional authority).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 2–3, 1 Stat. at
73–74 (dividing country into district courts and judges).
25. These courts or tribunals could also be referred to as “Article I courts,”
“Article I tribunals,” “legislative courts,” “legislative tribunals,” or “non-Article III
tribunals.”
26. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1–6 (2012) (outlining organization and structure of Su-
preme Court).  The Supreme Court currently “consist[s] of a Chief Justice” and
“eight associate justices, any six of whom shall constitute a quorum.” Id. § 1; see also
SUP. CT. OF U.S., The Court as an Institution, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
institution.aspx [https://perma.cc/TK8L-U7FE] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (dis-
cussing creation and history of Supreme Court).
27. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 43–44 (2012) (establishing Circuit Courts of Appeal and
providing for judges’ service and tenure in accordance with Article III); see also
FED. JUD. CTR., The U.S. Courts of Appeals and the Federal Judiciary, http://
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_of_appeals.html [https://perma.cc/
MTB9-5ZDJ] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
28. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 132-135 (2012) (establishing district courts and providing
for judges’ service and tenure in accordance with Article III); see also FED. JUD.
CTR., The U.S. District Courts and the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/courts_district.html [https://perma.cc/2M5U-FXPC] (last visited
Jan. 20, 2017).
29. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 251–252 (2012) (establishing Court of International
Trade and providing for judges’ service and tenure in accordance with Article III);
see also FED. JUD. CTR., The U.S. Court of International Trade, 1980–, http://
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_cit.html [https://perma.cc/
P98Y-NTFG] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (noting President “shall have power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to . . . appoint Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Ap-
pointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone,
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments”).
6
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office.31  These salary and tenure protections are intended to ensure the
independence of the judiciary.32
That the judicial branch has been vested with judicial power is not to
say the other branches of government have no role in the federal judici-
ary.  For example, Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution gives the Presi-
dent the power to nominate Supreme Court justices, “with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate.”33  Additionally, Congress possesses such powers as
the ability to alter the number of Supreme Court justices and to create
different types of jurisdiction for the various courts, each of which it has
done.34  Although Congress has certain powers affecting the judicial
branch, the Constitution vests judicial power itself solely with the judicial
branch—the Supreme Court and the inferior courts created under Article
III, as these are the only courts that possess the essential characteristics of
Article III judges and justices.35
This begs the question, what is judicial power, exactly?  In Muskrat v.
United States,36 Justice Miller spoke of this power as “the right to determine
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly instituted in
courts of proper jurisdiction.”37  In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,38 Justice
Scalia wrote, “Article III establishes a ‘judicial department’ with the ‘prov-
ince and duty . . . to say what the law is’ in particular cases and controver-
sies.”39  Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear that the judicial power is
31. See id. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.”).
32. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59
(1982) (“Both of these provisions were incorporated into the Constitution to en-
sure the independence of the Judiciary from the control of the Executive and Leg-
islative Branches of government.”).
33. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
34. See FED. JUD. CTR., Landmark Judicial Legislation: The Judiciary Act of 1869,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/landmark_10.html [https://
perma.cc/N5G9-AE3X] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (noting that Supreme Court was
first established with six justices and Congress has both decreased and increased
number of justices since Court was created); see also FED. JUD. CTR., Landmark Judi-
cial Legislation: The Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/landmark_11.html [https://perma.cc/LC9J-NYTD] (last visited
Jan. 20, 2017) (discussing various acts throughout history where Congress broad-
ened or narrowed federal court jurisdiction).
35. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 58 (“As an inseparable element of the
constitutional system of checks and balances, and as a guarantee of judicial impar-
tiality, Art. III both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judi-
cial Branch . . . .  The inexorable command of this provision is clear and definite.
The judicial power of the United States must be exercised by courts having the
attributes prescribed in Art. III.”).
36. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
37. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
38. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
39. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (quoting Mar-
bury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).  Justice Miller went on to state:
7
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the power to decide in a binding manner, with conclusive judgments, actual
cases and controversies that appear before the courts and are properly
within the courts’ jurisdiction.40
What cases and controversies, then, are within Article III’s jurisdic-
tion?  Article III conveniently lists specific areas of federal jurisdiction.41
In addition to establishing that the judicial power extends to all cases aris-
ing under the Constitution, Section 2 states that such power extends to all
cases “arising under . . . the Laws of the United States.”42  Federal securi-
ties laws are certainly among such cases, as all federal statutes are clearly
“Laws of the United States.”  Thus, if Article III is read literally, if the fed-
eral government chooses to allow for the use of federal judicial power over
any case and controversy alleging a violation of a federal securities law,
that case would seem to belong exclusively in the hands of the judicial
branch.43
But Article III has not been interpreted so literally, and in the United
States, cases and controversies are frequently heard outside of the Article
III judiciary, a practice widely upheld as constitutional by the Supreme
Court.44  Thus, while it is clear that Article III courts have judicial power to
The record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter of the
judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives the
Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide
them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierar-
chy—with an understanding, in short, that “a judgment conclusively re-
solves the case” because “a ‘judicial Power’ is one to render dispositive
judgments.”
Id. at 218–19 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 905, 926 (1990)).
40. See id. at 218–19.
41. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Specifically, Article II states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affect-
ing Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more
States;— between a State and Citizens of another State,—between Citi-
zens of different States,—between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
42. See id.
43. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall,
2011 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 190–91 (noting literal reading of Article III leads to con-
clusion that all inferior courts exercising judicial power must have judges that com-
port with Article III requirements of life tenure and salary protection).
44. See id. (“But it never has been that way.”); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribu-
nals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV.
643, 646 (2004) (“Nearly everyone agrees that Article III defies literal applica-
tion . . . .  [D]espite the importance of these provisions to the framing of the
Constitution and their centrality to founding-era notions of judicial independence
and the separation of powers, Congress has often assigned disputes that appear to
8
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render judgments in disputes involving federal securities laws, the ques-
tion that must be addressed is whether and when non-Article III courts or
tribunals can also be constitutionally granted such power by Congress or
otherwise.
C. The Creation, Constitutionality, and Power of Non-Article III Courts
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o
constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”45  It is worth noting
the literal distinction between this section’s use of the term “Tribunals”
and Article III’s use of the phrase “inferior Courts.”46  Article III estab-
lishes Congress’s power to create lower courts in the federal judiciary,
while Article I empowers Congress to create tribunals outside of the fed-
eral judiciary.47  Congress’s authority to create such non-Article III courts
has been upheld by the Supreme Court.48  Thus, Congress can create non-
Article III courts that possess certain judicial power.49  The Supreme
Court has placed limits on the use of such courts, but determining the
exact scope of these limits is difficult, if not impossible.50
Delivering the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline,
Justice Brennan held that Congress’s authority to create non-Article III
courts is quite limited.51  The Court identified only three “historically rec-
fall within the scope of the federal judicial power to Article I tribunals whose
judges lack salary and tenure protections.”).
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
46. See Pfander, supra note 44, at 650 (noting textual distinction in provisions
and potential importance to constitutional interpretation).
47. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929) (“While article 3 of
the Constitution declares, in section 1, that the judicial power of the United States
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in ‘such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish,’ and prescribes, in section 2, that this
power shall extend to cases and controversies of certain enumerated classes, it long
has been settled that article 3 does not express the full authority of Congress to
create courts . . . .”).
48. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 555–56 (1933) (“That
judicial power apart from that article may be conferred by Congress upon legisla-
tive courts, as well as upon constitutional courts, is plainly apparent . . . . [T]he
appellate jurisdiction of this court over judgments and decrees of the legislative
courts has been upheld and freely exercised under acts of Congress from a very
early period . . . .” (citation omitted)).
49. See id.
50. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985)
(“An absolute construction of Article III is not possible in this area of ‘frequently
arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.’” (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist & O’Connor, JJ.,
concurring))).
51. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co., 458 U.S. at 70 (“In sum, this Court has identified
three situations in which Art. III does not bar the creation of legislative courts.  In
each of these situations, the Court has recognized certain exceptional powers be-
stowed upon Congress by the Constitution or by historical consensus.  Only in the
face of such an exceptional grant of power has the Court declined to hold the
authority of Congress subject to the general prescriptions of Art. III.”).
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ognized situations” in which non-Article III courts could be created by
Congress and fall outside of Article III: “non-Art[icle] III courts of the
Territories or of the District of Columbia, courts-martial, and resolution of
‘public rights’ issues.”52  The Court declined to define what a “public
right” was “definitively” but ruled that, “at a minimum,” a public rights
issue must involve cases “between the government and others,” as opposed
to two private citizens.53  Such limits proved to be short-lived, and since
Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court has expanded the reach of non-Arti-
cle III courts into areas beyond the three listed in Northern Pipeline.54
Even prior to Northern Pipeline, our country has had a long history of
administering judicial functions through non-Article III courts in myriad
situations.55  A number of scholars have challenged the validity of such
tribunals on grounds that they violate a literal reading of Article III.56
Even among those who believe Article I tribunals violate a literal interpre-
tation of Article III, it is widely accepted that such tribunals are so firmly
settled as part of our system of jurisprudence that undoing them now
would be unfeasible.57  That said, it cannot be denied that the nation’s
52. See id. at 51 (discussing three historical situations as only situations “in
which the principle of independent adjudication commanded by Art. III does not
apply”).
53. See id. at 69 (“The distinction between public rights and private rights has
not been definitively explained in our precedents . . . [A] matter of public rights
must at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others.’” (quoting Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929))).
54. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 849
(1986) (allowing reparations complaint and subsequent common law counter-
claim between private parties to proceed in front of non-Article III ALJ because
complaining party waived Article III rights); Pfander, supra note 44, at 647–48 (“Af-
ter an ill-fated and relatively short-lived attempt to establish categorical limits to
non-Article III adjudication in the Northern Pipeline [sic] case, the Court has
seemingly retreated to a multifactored balancing test that includes judicial inde-
pendence as one factor and often results in validation of Article I tribunals.”).
55. See Pfander, supra note 44, at 656–67 (“Ever since the earliest days of the
Republic, Congress has staffed Article I tribunals with non-Article III judges and
has charged them with resolving matters that most observers regarded as coming
within the scope of the judicial power of the United States . . . .”).
56. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Uni-
tary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1189 (1992) (“Professor Red-
ish concludes from the language of the Article III Vesting Clause that legislative
courts are illegitimate to the extent that they exercise judicial power of the United
States . . . .  The words of the Article III Vesting Clause permit no other conclu-
sion.” (footnote omitted)); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of
Formalism, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 853, 908 (1990) (noting that formalist reading of Con-
stitution renders Article I territorial courts unconstitutional because “[a]ll judicial
proceedings in the territories, whether involving national or local law, must take
place before tribunals whose judges satisfy the tenure and salary provisions of
[A]rticle III”); Pfander, supra note 42, at 660 (“Scholars have largely . . . sug-
gest[ed] that our institutional history essentially forecloses a literal reading of the
text . . . .”).
57. See e.g., Pfander, supra note 44, at 775 (“A return to literalism, though
supported by a few hardy formalists, has seemed unthinkable to those who recog-
nize and accept the vast scope of the administrative state.”).
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss1/7
2017] A CALL FOR REFORM 271
current system of non-Article III courts, including the administrative tribu-
nals utilized by the SEC, does not strictly adhere to the words of Article
III.58  Nevertheless, given the widespread use and acceptance of adminis-
trative tribunals, it is highly doubtful that any challenge to the SEC’s ALJs
on Article III grounds would be successful.59  Given that the Supreme
Court has upheld the constitutionality of non-Article III courts, those chal-
lenging their validity have found it necessary to look to other legal theo-
ries.  In order to better understand these legal challenges, this Article next
provides an explanation of the modern U.S. administrative law tribunals
system, generally, and SEC administrative law tribunals, specifically.
D. The United States Administrative Law Tribunal System
The modern structure of the administrative tribunal and ALJ system
dates to June 11, 1946, when Congress enacted the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).60  The APA authorized administrative agencies’ use of
“examiners” to preside over agencies’ adjudicative hearings.61  The 1946
APA was repealed as part of the general revision of the U.S. Code, and in
the current version of the APA, these examiners are referred to as ALJs.62
Agency hearings may now be presided over by “(1) the agency; (2) one or
more members of the body which comprises the agency; or (3) one or
more administrative law judges appointed under section 3105 of this
title.”63
These administrative tribunals adjudicate parties’ rights within their
respective agency’s purview and operate very much like court proceedings.
Among other powers, the presiding party may make factual findings, take
depositions, and issue subpoenas.64  ALJs have broad statutory authority to
58. See Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Mur-
ray’s Lessee through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 768–69 (1987) (noting
that Supreme Court has clearly not interpreted Article III literally and has allowed
for adjudication of disputes to occur in non-Article III courts).
59. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
77 (1982) (noting administrative agencies utilizing adjudicative power as “ad-
juncts” of courts has been upheld as constitutional); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450, n.7 (1977) (“In cases
which do involve only ‘private rights,’ this Court has accepted factfinding by an
administrative agency, without intervention by a jury, only as an adjunct to an Art.
III court . . . .”).
60. See Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237.
61. See id. § 11, 60 Stat. at 244 (“Subject to the civil-service and other laws to
the extent not inconsistent with this Act, there shall be appointed by and for each
agency as many qualified and competent examiners as may be necessary for
proceedings . . . .”).
62. See 5 U.S.C. § 556 (b)(3) (2012) (noting that administrative hearings may
be presided over by “one or more administrative law judges appointed under sec-
tion 3105 of this title”); 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012) (“Each agency shall appoint as
many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings . . . .”).
63. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b).
64. See id. § 556(c) (listing activities in which “employees presiding at hear-
ings” may take part).
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preside over and rule on cases brought before them, and those decisions
usually “become[ ] the decision[s]” of the ALJs’ respective agencies.65
While there is a right to appeal these agency decisions to an Article III
court, the standard of review is quite deferential to the agency.66
ALJs are employees of their respective agencies, but their hiring is
coordinated by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM).67  Cre-
ated by a 1978 act of Congress, OPM “is an independent establishment in
the executive branch.”68  In an effort to ensure the hiring of qualified
ALJs, OPM has instituted several qualification requirements in the areas of
licensing, qualification, and examination, as well as conditions for contin-
ued employment.69  Also, OPM, as overseer of the General Schedule clas-
sification and pay system that covers the majority of federal civilian
employees, determines and manages the pay of ALJs.70  As with other fed-
eral employees, ALJs’ pay is not protected against salary diminishment.71
In contrast to Article III judges, then, ALJs are hired, rather than ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and lack lifetime
tenure protection.
E. SEC Administrative Tribunals
With an understanding of administrative tribunals, generally, this Ar-
ticle turns specifically to SEC ALJs.  Currently, the SEC employs five
ALJs.72  These ALJs are housed in the Office of Administrative Law Judges,
65. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2012) (“When the agency did not preside at the
reception of the evidence, the presiding employee . . . shall initially decide the case
unless the agency requires, either in specific cases or by general rule, the entire
record to be certified to it for decision.  When the presiding employee makes an
initial decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the agency without
further proceedings unless there is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the
agency within time provided by rule.”).
66. See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
67. See OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT., Administrative Law Judges, https://
www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/ [https://
perma.cc/HWP7-PHQV] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (noting agency is responsible
for “planning, operating and directing the recruitment, examination and employ-
ment of ALJs”).
68. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 201, 92 Stat.
1111, 1118–21 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1105 (2012)).
69. See OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT., Qualification Standard for Administrative Law
Judge Positions, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/classification-qualifica-
tions/general-schedule-qualification-standards/specialty-areas/administrative-law-
judge-positions/ [https://perma.cc/QRG8-GWX4] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
70. See OFF. PERSONNEL MGMT., Pay & Leave, https://www.opm.gov/policy-
data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/2015/executive-senior-level [https://
perma.cc/4TSF-GTNW] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (providing 2015 employee pay
tables for ALJs).
71. See 5 C.F.R. § 536.308 (2016) (setting forth rules regarding administrative
employee pay retention and providing examples of when pay can be changed).
72. See, e.g, Letter from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher to Clients & Friends 2 (Jan.
12, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2014-Year-End-
Securities-Enforcement-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3BS-2QXG] (noting
12
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an office within the Division of Enforcement.73  The SEC’s Division of En-
forcement pursues legal action against alleged violators of federal securi-
ties laws in two venues: (1) lawsuits in federal courts, or (2) in-house
administrative hearings conducted by its staff of ALJs.74  The SEC consid-
ers this function to be very important, as, in its own words,
[f]irst and foremost, the SEC is a law enforcement agency.  The
Enforcement Division assists the Commission in executing its law
enforcement function by recommending the commencement of
investigations of securities law violations, by recommending that
the Commission bring civil actions in federal court or before an
administrative law judge, and by prosecuting these cases on be-
half of the Commission.75
If the SEC pursues administrative enforcement, which it does by issu-
ing an Order Instituting Proceedings, the hearing is presided over by one
of the SEC’s five ALJs, and the SEC describes the ALJs as “independent
adjudicators.”76  In these hearings, these ALJs act very much like judges in
federal court and possess many of the same judicial powers.77  Upon hear-
ing the evidence presented by the parties in the hearing, the ALJ has the
authority to issue findings of fact, legal conclusions, and even order sanc-
tions.78  Further, ALJs have great discretion regarding the scope of these
hearings and may even dispose of cases summarily without a live eviden-
number of ALJs increased from three to five in 2014 to handle “increased adminis-
trative caseload”).
73. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Office of Administrative Law Judges, http://
www.sec.gov/alj [https://perma.cc/KP9Q-V4WP] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017) (dis-
cussing SEC’s Office of ALJs).
74. See What We Do, supra note 2 (“Whether the Commission decides to bring
a case in federal court or within the SEC before an administrative law judge may
depend upon the type of sanction or relief that is being sought.  For example, the
Commission may bar someone from the brokerage industry in an administrative
proceeding, but an order barring someone from acting as a corporate officer or
director must be obtained in federal court.  Often, when the misconduct warrants
it, the Commission will bring both proceedings.”).
75. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, How Investigations Work, https://www.sec.gov/
News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 [https://perma.cc/VZ3B-9SCB]
(last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
76. See Office of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 73 (“Administrative law
judges serve as independent adjudicators.”).
77. See id. (“Under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Commission’s
Rules of Practice, administrative law judges conduct public hearings . . . in a man-
ner similar to non-jury trials in the federal district courts . . . .  [T]hey issue subpoe-
nas, hold prehearing conferences, and rule on motions and the admissibility of
evidence.”).
78. See id. (noting that SEC ALJs have power to order sanctions including
“cease-and-desist orders; investment company and officer-and-director bars; cen-
sures, suspensions, [and] limitations on activities”).
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tiary hearing.79  In either case, “[a]n initial decision becomes final when
the Commission enters a finality order.”80
While this process grants significant authority to ALJs, either the SEC
or the defendant may appeal the ALJ’s decision to the Commission, which
conducts a de novo review.81  The Commission also has discretion to review
a decision “on its own initiative,” without appeal of the parties.82  Within
sixty days of the date of the ruling, the parties have a further right of ap-
peal to an appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals—either the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, the appeals court in the circuit
where the appellant resides, or the appeals court in the circuit where the
appellant’s principal place of business is located.83
II. OPPOSITION TO SEC TRIBUNALS
While the SEC’s administrative tribunal system has existed for quite
some time, opposition to the SEC’s use of these tribunals has recently
gained significant traction.84  This recent spike in opposition resulted
chiefly from the SEC’s decision to bring more cases before their tribunals,
instead of federal courts, in response to new powers granted to them by
Dodd-Frank.85
Before Dodd-Frank, the SEC could seek civil monetary penalties in
administrative hearings against only “registered” parties for alleged viola-
79. See id. (noting possibility of “summary disposition” with respect to “cer-
tain proceedings”).
80. Id.
81. See id. (noting that Commission “performs a de novo review [of initial deci-
sions] and can affirm, reverse, modify, set aside, or remand for further
proceedings”).
82. See id.
83. See id.; 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1) (2012) (“A person aggrieved by a final order
of the Commission entered pursuant to this chapter may obtain review of the or-
der in the United States Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has
his principal place of business, or for the District of Columbia Circuit, by filing in
such court, within sixty days after the entry of the order, a written petition request-
ing that the order be modified or set aside in whole or in part.”).
84. See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 6 (“Given that administrative law judges
are employees of the S.E.C., defendants wonder if they can be fair.”).
85. See Robert Anello, Addressing the SEC’s Administrative “Home Court” Advan-
tage in Enforcement Proceedings, FORBES (Sept. 7, 2015, 4:40 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2015/09/07/addressing-the-secs-administrative-
home-court-advantage-in-enforcement-proceedings/#4226cc6454ea [https://
perma.cc/UYH9-CS4U] (“In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act provided the SEC with the
option of pursuing administrative proceedings in lieu of filing an action in federal
court in cases in which it sought monetary penalties.  The agency embraced this
option whole-heartedly.”); Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. Dist. Judge for the S. Dist. of N.Y., Is
the S.E.C. Becoming a Law unto Itself?, Keynote Address at the PLI Securities Reg-
ulation Institute 5 (Nov. 5, 2014), https://securitiesdiary.files.wordpress.com/
2014/11/rakoff-pli-speech.pdf [https://perma.cc/LQU8-TSRP] (discussing ex-
pansion of administrative powers granted to SEC post Dodd-Frank and how SEC
has used expanded powers by bringing more administrative proceedings).
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tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.86  For unregistered parties
violating the Securities Act of 1933, the SEC could pursue monetary penal-
ties only in federal courts because the SEC administrative courts had au-
thority only to issue cease-and-desist orders.87  However, Dodd-Frank
granted the SEC the power to pursue civil monetary penalties administra-
tively with respect to violations of the 1933 Act, and not just regarding
registered parties violating the 1934 Act.88  This change opened a new
class of potential defendants to the SEC, and the SEC began to exercise
this new authority in earnest, taking an increased number of actions to its
tribunals instead of federal court.89  In 2015, the SEC began to reduce the
number of cases it sent to its ALJs.90  This pullback has been “inter-
preted . . . as a shift from the agency’s previous push to get more cases in
front of [its own ALJs]” and as a response to the backlash against their
increased use of tribunals.91  For example, Judge Jed Rakoff, of the U.S.
86. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(a), (b)(1) (2012) (allowing SEC to pursue civil
monetary penalties in administrative hearings arising from violations of 1934 Act).
87. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(a) (2006) (allowing for cease and desist orders to be
issued by SEC without going to court against any person that is “violating, has
violated, or is about to violate” Securities Act of 1933 “after notice and opportunity
for hearing” in administrative proceeding).
88. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862
(2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (amending 15 U.S.C. § 77h–1 to allow SEC
to seek monetary penalties in cease and desist actions filed in administrative
proceedings).
89. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2014, 9:40 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-
trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590 (noting that SEC posited that changes
brought about by Dodd-Frank would increase SEC Division of Enforcement’s “ef-
fectiveness and efficiency”); see also Rakoff, supra note 85, at 6 (“While a claim to
greater efficiency by any federal bureaucracy suggests a certain chutzpah, it is hard
to find a better example of what is sometimes disparagingly called ‘administrative
creep’ than this expansion of the S.E.C.’s internal enforcement power.”).  But see
Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement Statistics,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 977 (2016) (“The way that the SEC counts enforcement
actions filed and aggregate monetary penalties ordered consistently overstates the
SEC’s enforcement outputs, masks trends, obscures real problems in enforcement,
and reveals non-existent ‘problems’ that the SEC then tries to resolve.”).
90. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Trims Use of In-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11,
2015, 9:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-trims-use-of-in-house-judges-
1444611604 (“A review of 160 cases affecting more than 500 defendants shows that
in the three months through September, the SEC sent just 11%—four of 36—of its
contested cases to its administrative law judges.  That was down from 40% in the
like period of 2014.  For the full fiscal year ended Sept. 30, the SEC used its inter-
nal tribunal for 28% of its contested cases, compared with 43% for the previous 12
months, according to the analysis and SEC data, both of which exclude settled and
routine cases.”).
91. See id. (“The pullback comes on the heels of a meeting this spring in
which Andrew Ceresney, SEC director of enforcement, told his senior staff it
should send contested cases alleging insider trading or accounting fraud to federal
court unless there were good reasons to use the SEC judges, said people close to
the agency.  Some familiar with the meeting interpreted the remarks as a shift
from the agency’s previous push to get more cases in front of in-house judges.”).
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District Court for the Southern District of New York, has argued that the
SEC’s increased use of their expanded administrative powers “hinders the
balanced development of the securities laws.”92  On October 22, 2015,
U.S. Congressman Scott Garrett introduced legislation in the House of
Representatives to “opt out of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
current enforcement proceedings” and appear in federal court, instead.93
These and other challenges to the SEC’s tribunals are based on several
areas of concern.  This Part focuses on chief criticisms of the SEC’s tribu-
nals, including allegations of insufficient procedural due process protec-
tions for tribunal defendants and bias by ALJs toward the SEC.  Such
opposition has been mounted by politicians, academics, legal practition-
ers, judges, and others.
A. Lack of Due Process
One criticism of the SEC’s use of tribunals is the lack of procedural
due process afforded defendants relative to that received in federal
court.94  Due process—in essence, basic fairness—is a fundamental part of
our nation’s judiciary.95  While SEC tribunals are not part of the judicial
branch, all branches of the U.S. government are still subject to the U.S.
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment guarantee that “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”96
Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently held that government actions
involving a broad array of liberty or property interests, even if they occur
in a non-article III court, trigger procedural-due-process requirements.97
92. See Rakoff, supra note 85, at 11 (“In short, what you have here are broad
anti-fraud provisions . . . that have historically been construed and elaborated by
the federal courts but that, under Dodd-Frank, could increasingly be construed
and interpreted by the S.E.C.’s administrative law judges if the S.E.C. chose to
bring its more significant cases in that forum . . . .  [T]his is unlikely, I submit, to
lead to as balanced, careful, and impartial interpretations as would result from
having those cases brought in federal court . . . .  [I]t would not be good for the
impartial development of the law in an area of immense practical importance.”).
93. See House Bill to Weaken SEC Enforcement Moves Ahead, THINKADVISOR (Mar.
2, 2016), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2016/03/02/house-bill-to-weaken-sec-en-
forcement-moves-ahead [https://perma.cc/HPC8-24R8].  On March 2, 2016, Rep.
Garrett’s bill was reported by committee for consideration by the full chamber.
For the bill’s current status, see H.R. 3798 (114th): Due Process Restoration Act of
2015, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr3798 [https://
perma.cc/ARB9-KQU3] (last visited Jan. 20, 2017).
94. See House Bill to Weaken SEC Enforcement Moves Ahead, supra note 93 (“‘I
[am] pleased that today the Financial Services Committee passed my bill to restore
the due process rights of all Americans by allowing them to have their case before
the SEC heard by a federal court.’” (quoting Rep. Scott Garrett)).
95. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair
tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”).
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977) (holding corporate pun-
ishment administered in public school was liberty interest subject to due process
constraints); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539–40 (1971) (holding suspension or
revocation of driver’s license requires procedural due process); Goldberg v. Kelly,
16
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However, while procedural due process is easily triggered, the Supreme
Court has held that the level of due process required does not have to be
comparable to the level received in an Article III court.98
In determining whether the procedure at issue satisfies the demands
of due process, the Supreme Court has employed a balancing test that
considers such interests as the type of liberty or property interest subject to
the governmental action, the risk that the procedure used will lead to “an
erroneous deprivation of such interest,” the “probable value” of more ro-
bust procedures, and the burden on the government if it must employ
additional procedures.99  Thus, for example, in a case involving the termi-
nation of welfare benefits, the Court held that due process required “a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing” due to the type of benefits at stake
and the applicant’s potential need of the benefits for subsistence.100  How-
ever, in other situations, the Court has held that the liberty interest or
governmental benefit at issue was not substantial enough to require an
evidentiary hearing prior to the government action related to that
interest.101
Thus, while it may seem fundamentally unfair for a defendant facing
legal action before an SEC tribunal not to receive at least the same
amount of due process that defendants facing action in federal court re-
ceive, the Supreme Court has held procedures akin to those in federal
court are not the only ones that will fulfill the requirements of due pro-
cess.102  However, that does not mean that a procedural-due-process claim
could not be successful if the procedural safeguards present do not ade-
quately protect the defendant’s interests at stake.  Thus, it is important to
discuss the level of procedural process given in SEC tribunals, as com-
pared to those in federal court, as well as the liberty interests at stake in an
SEC tribunal.
With respect to the liberty and property interests at stake, they are
quite severe.  Under both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the SEC can obtain
397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding procedural due process constraints apply to
termination of welfare benefits by government agency).
98. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexi-
ble and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands.”); Bell, 402 U.S. at 540 (“A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in
one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case.  Thus,
procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony
charge.” (citing Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 270–71; Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963))).
99. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321, 335 (1976) (discussing inter-
ests considered in determining what process is due).
100. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264 (“Thus the crucial factor in this context . . . is
that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may
deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.”).
101. See, e.g., Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 683 (holding procedural due process “does
not require notice and a hearing prior to the imposition of corporal punishment
in the public schools”).
102. See supra note 98.
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significant monetary penalties via their tribunals.103  Under the 1933 Act,
these monetary penalties range from $7,500 to $150,000 per violation for
natural persons and $75,000 to $725,000 per violation for any other per-
son.104  Under the 1934 Act, these monetary penalties range from $5,000
to $100,000 per violation for natural persons, and $50,000 to $500,000 per
violation for any other person, or if greater than these ranges, the gross
pecuniary gain as a result of the violation.105  Depending on the number
of violations alleged, the size of the monetary penalties that can be im-
posed is theoretically limitless.  Additionally, defendants in administrative
hearings face the potential for their livelihood to be disrupted or perma-
nently taken away by the imposition of a ban from acting as an officer or
director of a publicly-traded company.106  Under any measure, it is diffi-
cult to argue that the liberty and property interests at stake before SEC
administrative tribunals are not severe.  Because the interests at stake are
substantial, one would expect that the procedural due process accompany-
ing these tribunals would be roughly equal.107  Unfortunately, many critics
have asserted that this is not the case and that the procedural protections
found in SEC administrative tribunals fall far short of those found in fed-
eral court.
One due-process shortcoming of SEC tribunals is the limited discov-
ery they afford defendants.  Defendants facing action before an SEC tribu-
nal are given less opportunity to gather evidence than are defendants
facing action in federal courts, which adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure’s rules of discovery.108  These rules are designed to allow par-
ties to the dispute great latitude in gathering evidence in order to substan-
tiate or defend their claims.109  The court does have discretion to limit
discovery, such as the number of depositions taken or interrogatories al-
lowed, but by and large, the parties are free to tailor discovery to the spe-
103. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(g) (2012) (imposing monetary penalties in admin-
istrative hearings for violations of 1933 Act); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2012)
(imposing monetary penalties in administrative hearings for violations of 1934
Act).
104. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(g)(1)–(2) (providing range of monetary penalties
allowed in administrative hearings under 1933 Act).
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (providing range of monetary penal-
ties allowed in administrative hearings under 1934 Act).
106. See 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(f); 15 U.S.C § 77u(d)(2).
107. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) (“A procedural rule that may
satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due pro-
cess in every case.  Thus, procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may
not suffice to try a felony charge.” (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270–71
(1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))).
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (providing general framework for discovery in fed-
eral court).
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by court order,
the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and propor-
tional to the needs of the case . . . .  Information within this scope of discovery
need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”).
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cific needs of the case.110  Additionally, because the judge is an
independent adjudicator not subject to control by either party, presuma-
bly any limits placed on discovery will be decided in a relatively fair and
unbiased manner.111  Thus, even when one of the parties is the govern-
ment in civil actions in federal court, the parties are procedurally on equal
footing with respect to their ability to marshal evidence to either support
their claims or defend themselves.112
By contrast, the discovery allowed to defendants in SEC administrative
tribunals is far more limited.  As an initial matter, the SEC has broad inves-
tigative authority to secure evidence related to a potential violation of the
securities laws.113  The SEC can take months, or even years, gathering evi-
dence and mounting a case against a defendant it plans to take a case
before an SEC tribunal.114  However, once the proceeding is initiated, an
evidentiary hearing before an SEC ALJ can occur as quickly as one month
from when the SEC begins an enforcement proceeding.115  Thus, from
the outset, the deck seems to be stacked against the defendant from a
discovery standpoint.
Discovery limits placed on defendants once a hearing is initiated fur-
ther exacerbate this deck-stacking.  For example, unlike defendants in fed-
eral courts, defendants subject to SEC tribunals are more limited in their
ability to depose a party by oral examination.116  Any party wishing to take
a deposition is required to file a detailed written motion justifying the
need for the deposition.117  Whether to grant the motion is at the discre-
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) (discussing scheduling conference of parties and
creation of discovery plan for case).
111. See U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.  The Constitution’s tenure and salary protec-
tions help ensure that judges are truly independent adjudicators, not beholden to
any outside party.
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. Title V.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply to
all parties, government and non-government alike.
113. See How Investigations Work, supra note 75 (“All SEC investigations are
conducted privately.  Facts are developed to the fullest extent possible through
informal inquiry, interviewing witnesses, examining brokerage records, reviewing
trading data, and other methods.  With a formal order of investigation, the Divi-
sion’s staff may compel witnesses by subpoena to testify and produce books,
records, and other relevant documents.  Following an investigation, SEC staff pre-
sent their findings to the Commission for its review.  The Commission can author-
ize the staff to file a case in federal court or bring an administrative action.  In
many cases, the Commission and the party charged decide to settle a matter with-
out trial.”).
114. See id.
115. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(a)(2)(ii) (2016) (providing that under shortest
time period of 120 days “the hearing officer shall issue an order scheduling the
hearing to begin approximately one month . . . from the date of service of the
order instituting the proceeding”).
116. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.233 (2016) (providing procedures for taking deposi-
tions in SEC administrative proceedings).
117. See id. § 201.233(a).
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tion of the Commission or the presiding ALJ.118  The same is true for dep-
ositions by written questions.119  A party is allowed to request the issuance
of a subpoena requiring attendance of a witness or production of a docu-
ment, but once again, the granting of any such subpoena is within the
discretion of the ALJ or other SEC officials.120  Thus, if brought before an
SEC administrative tribunal, a defendant can find itself involved in a pro-
ceeding against an adversary that has already conducted a thorough inves-
tigation pursuant to broad investigatory powers, but the defendant will
have limited ability to engage in discovery to dispute the allegations.  Fur-
ther, an adjudicatory authority whose independence, due to affiliation
with the agency, is questionable at best, has broad discretion as to the
scope of discovery.121  The difference in procedure between this proceed-
ing and that of federal court is stark.
Once the hearing begins, the procedural shortcomings continue.
The ALJ has virtually unfettered discretion regarding what evidence will
be admitted, including what witnesses will be allowed and even whether
those witnesses can be cross examined.122  The only standard is whether
evidence is relevant, as determined by the Commission or hearing of-
ficer.123  Thus, for example, a hearing officer would be free to admit hear-
say evidence, as long as it is deemed relevant.124  These rules for evidence,
admissibility, and the calling of witnesses can fairly be summed up as
whatever evidence the Commission or hearing officer deems relevant to
the case at hand.125
118. See id. § 201.233(b) (specifying that requests to depose are “[i]n the dis-
cretion of the Commission or the hearing officer”).
119. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.234 (2016) (setting forth procedure by which parties
may procure depositions by written questions, which are substantially similar to
those for oral depositions).
120. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.232 (2016) (setting forth requirements for issuance of
subpoenas to compel witness testimony and discretion given to SEC official re-
quested to issue subpoena to deny request).
121. See infra Part V.B.
122. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.320(a) (2016) (“[T]he Commission or the hearing
officer may receive relevant evidence and shall exclude all evidence that is irrele-
vant, immaterial, unduly repetitious, or unreliable.”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 201.326
(2016) (“In any proceeding in which a hearing is required to be conducted on the
record . . . a party is entitled to present its case or defense by oral or documentary
evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as,
in the discretion of the Commission or the hearing officer, may be required for a
full and true disclosure of the facts.  The scope and form of evidence, rebuttal
evidence, if any, and cross-examination, if any, in any other proceeding shall be
determined by the Commission or the hearing officer in each proceeding.”).
123. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.320(a) (2016).
124. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal
Administrative Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (discussing “significant institutional dis-
tinctions between agencies and courts” with respect to evidentiary rules); see also
William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 829 (2005).
125. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.320(a) (2016).
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All of these procedural shortcomings might be forgiven, or at least
overlooked, if there were an opportunity for a meaningful appeal from the
hearing.  However, any appeal from an SEC ALJ’s initial ruling proceeds
to the SEC.126  Therefore, in essence, the appeal is heard by the same
entity that heard the evidence and issued a ruling.  Any subsequent appeal
is to a federal circuit court, where the decision of the SEC is given great
deference.127  Findings of fact made by the Commission need to be sup-
ported only by “substantial evidence,” and findings of law will not be over-
turned unless there is a finding of an abuse of discretion.128  While such a
deferential standard might be appropriate if the procedures in place at
the hearing level were more adequate, given the potential for unfairness
inherent in the administrative hearing procedures, the appellate review
procedure provides little aid to defendants in SEC proceedings.  Consider-
ing all of the procedural shortcomings present in the SEC’s tribunals,
Judge Jed Rakoff writes, “It is hardly surprising in these circumstances that
the S.E.C. won 100% of its internal administrative hearings in the fiscal
year ending September 30, 2014, whereas it won only 61% of its trials in
federal court during the same period.”129
Russell G. Ryan, a former assistant direct of the SEC’s Division of En-
forcement, writes,
Based mostly on precedent established before the SEC had any
power to punish, courts have exempted SEC prosecutions from
many bedrock due-process protections taken for granted in crim-
inal cases.  The presumption of innocence, for example, is
largely meaningless because the SEC can win by a mere “prepon-
derance of the evidence” rather than proof beyond reasonable
126. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 201.410–411 (2016) (noting that decisions in proceed-
ings may be appealed to Commission and any such appeal is prerequisite to judi-
cial review).
127. See Svalberg v. SEC., 876 F.2d 181, 185 (1989) (“The main point is that a
court should not second-guess the judgment of the Commission in connection
with the imposition of sanctions, unless the SEC has acted contrary to law, without
basis in fact or in abuse of discretion.”).
128. See Wonsover v. SEC, 205 F.3d 408, 412 (2000) (noting Commission’s
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence and findings of law will not be
overturned unless “ ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law’” (quoting Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855, 860 (D.C. Cir.
2000))).
129. Rakoff, supra note 85, at 7; see also Robert Loeb, Jason M. Halper & Marc
R. Shapiro, Supreme Court Declines to Address the Constitutionality of Securities and Ex-
change Administrative Forum, ORRICK (Mar. 30, 2016), http://blogs.orrick.com/se-
curities-litigation/2016/03/30/breaking-news-supreme-court-declines-to-address-
the-constitutionality-of-securities-and-exchange-administrative-forum/ [https://
perma.cc/XKU4-5SDM] (“The consequences of being subject to an SEC adminis-
trative review process are significant.  In federal court, a defendant is entitled to
full civil discovery, complete application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and Evidence, in most cases, a jury trial, and adjudication by a neutral arbiter,
while a respondent in a SEC proceeding is entitled to none of these protections.
The results of that incongruity speak for themselves.”).
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doubt.  The right to remain silent is equally hollow because
courts let the SEC treat silence as evidence of guilt.  For SEC de-
fendants who can’t afford a good lawyer, tough luck, because
there’s no right to have counsel appointed at government ex-
pense as there would be in a criminal prosecution.  And even
when the SEC loses after trial, double jeopardy doesn’t prevent it
from trying to reverse the verdict or force a retrial, as it would a
criminal prosecutor.  Dodd-Frank made things even worse by ex-
panding the SEC’s ability to impose draconian financial penalties
in administrative proceedings that have lax evidentiary rules, no
jury trial, and limited judicial oversight.130
Not surprisingly, procedural-due-process claims have been brought
against the SEC and are pending.  In a recent case, George Jarkesy Jr. and
his Patriot28 fund filed a suit seeking a preliminary injunction barring the
SEC “from proceeding with an administrative proceeding” on due-process
grounds.131  This case involves an SEC enforcement action brought in an
administrative tribunal, alleging violations of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and
seeking monetary penalties and other relief.132  Among the many proce-
dural irregularities and constitutional violations alleged by the plaintiffs,
including an equal protection claim,133 the plaintiffs raise due process is-
sues arising from the procedural deficiencies inherent in the SEC’s admin-
istrative tribunal Rules of Practice, including:
that the SEC’s short schedules between service and the date of
the hearing do not provide adequate time to prepare a
defense;134
that the Commission adjudged them guilty before the date of the
hearing by making findings of fact and conclusions of law against
them in a settlement order entered into by plaintiffs in the
case;135 and
130. See Russell G. Ryan, When Regulators Think They’re Prosecutors, WALL ST. J.,
(Apr. 8, 2014, 7:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230397
8304579471273139675110.
131. See Complaint at 1, Jarkesy v. SEC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C. Jan. 29,
2014) (No. 1:14-cv-00114-BAH).
132. See id. at 3–4 (“The Division seeks disgorgement of fees, lifetime securi-
ties-industry and officer-and-director bars, $100 million in penalties, and a cease-
and-desist order.”).
133. See id. at 7–10 (arguing that SEC’s charging plaintiffs in administrative
tribunal, rather than in federal court, deprived them of equal protection where
others had been charged in federal court and given jury trial).
134. See id. at 5 (noting that SEC’s rules of practice allow only up to 300 days
from service to prepare for trial, “regardless of the complexity of the issues”).
135. See id. at 6–7 (discussing SEC’s findings of fact made in Commission or-
der entered in before date of hearing involving plaintiffs).
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that the SEC provided them with “700 gigabytes[ ] of data” ob-
tained during their investigation that “could not possibly” be re-
viewed within the timeframe for when the hearing would be
held, and refused to disclose what exculpatory or impeachment
materials were in the data.136
The plaintiffs’ request for an injunction was denied at the trial level
not for substantive reasons, but rather because the district court deter-
mined it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim because
the statutory scheme at issue provided a specific appeals process.137  Thus,
the district court ruled that the plaintiffs would have “to raise all of their
constitutional claims” in the administrative proceeding, and then appeal
to the Court of Appeals if the result was “adverse to them.”138  As a result
of the SEC administrative proceeding, Jarkesy and Patriot 28 were ruled to
have violated the securities laws, and their constitutional claims were de-
nied.139  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district
court’s holding that the securities laws provide for a specific adjudication
and appeals process that did not allow for the filing of a federal court case
challenging the constitutionality of a pending administrative proceed-
ing.140  While the court did not reach the merits of the due process claims
in this case, the case illustrates the procedural problems alleged against
the SEC’s use of administrative tribunals.
Presumably in response to the rising tide of criticism about the fair-
ness of their tribunals, on September 24, 2015, the SEC proposed certain
changes to their Rules of Practice.141  The proposed changes include ex-
tending the time defendants have to prepare for the evidentiary hearing
136. See id. at 12–13 (noting that SEC rules of practice require SEC to disclose
any exculpatory or impeachment materials gathered in investigation and alleging
that SEC refused to do so).
137. See Jarkesy v. SEC, 48 F. Supp. 3d 32, 40 (D.D.C. 2014), aff’d, 803 F.3d 9
(2015).  In affirming the decision of the district court, the D.C. Circuit stated,
“[t]he court concluded that Congress, by establishing a detailed statutory scheme
providing for an administrative proceeding before the Commission plus the pros-
pect of judicial review in a court of appeals, implicitly precluded concurrent dis-
trict-court jurisdiction over challenges like Jarkesy’s.” See Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d 9,
12 (2015).
138. See Jarkesy, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 38.
139. See id. at 35.
140. See Jarkesy, 803 F.3d at 30 (“We hold that the securities laws provide an
exclusive avenue for judicial review that Jarkesy may not bypass by filing suit in
district court.”).
141. See Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes to Amend Rules
Governing Administrative Proceedings (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2015-209.html [https://perma.cc/66GD-ZRDG] (“The pro-
posed amendments seek to modernize our rules of practice for administrative pro-
ceedings, including provisions for additional time and prescribed discovery for the
parties.” (quoting Mary Jo White, SEC Chair)); see also Amendments to the Com-
mission’s Rules of Practice, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,091 (Oct. 5, 2015).
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and allowing parties limited opportunity to take depositions.142  The
SEC’s proposal notes that the agency has, from time to time, amended its
Rules of Practice, but this occasion is unique in that it appears to respond
to growing public criticism.143  However, some critics say the changes do
not go far enough and still leave defendants well short of the range of
procedural protections afforded by federal courts.144  Furthermore, the
consensus among those who submitted comments to the SEC’s proposed
rule changes was that such changes were inadequate.145
On July 13, 2016, the SEC amended its Rules of Practice (changes
effective September 27, 2016).146  Regarding the changes, then SEC Chair
Mary Jo White stated, “[t]he amendments to the Commission’s rules of
practice provide parties with additional opportunities to conduct deposi-
tions and add flexibility to the timelines of our administrative proceed-
ings, while continuing to promote the fair and timely resolution of the
142. See SEC Proposes to Amend Rules Governing Administrative Proceed-
ings, supra note 141 (describing proposed amendments to rules of practice to
change timing of practice, as well as rules of discovery).
143. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Gives Ground on Judges, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 24,
2015, 8:03 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-gives-ground-on-judges-
1443139425 (noting that rule change “marks the first time the agency has publicly
ceded ground to the swelling ranks of critics of its internal court, a group that
includes federal judges, former SEC officials and business groups”).
144. See Peter K.M. Chan et. al., Morgan Lewis Discusses Tweaking the “Home
Court” Rules for SEC Administrative Proceedings, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/10/14/morgan-lewis-discusses-tweak-
ing-the-home-court-rules-for-sec-administrative-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/
F9FL-8N2Y] (discussing proposed rule changes but noting they do nothing to ad-
dress “core question[s]” of fairness, such as independence of ALJs); Why the SEC’s
Proposed Changes to Its Rules of Practice Are Woefully Inadequate—Part I, SEC. DIARY
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://securitiesdiary.com/2015/10/08/why-the-secs-proposed-
changes-to-its-rules-of-practice-are-woefully-inadequate-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/
QWU3-N39D] (criticizing SEC’s proposed rule and giving them “F+” with respect
to addressing issues of fairness and due process); William F. Johnson, SEC Behind
Times in ‘Modernizing’ Administrative Proceedings, N.Y.L.J. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://
www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/2015articles/11-05-
15_New-York-Law-Journal_Johnson.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGK7-Q29K] (“These
proposals, although a step in the right direction, still do not go far enough to
leveling the playing field for respondents.”).
145. See Alison Frankel, SEC to Vote Wednesday on Rule Changes for Administrative
Proceedings, REUTERS (July 11, 2016), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/
2016/07/11/sec-to-vote-wednesday-on-rule-changes-for-administrative-proceed-
ings/ [https://perma.cc/68TR-ZQ6A] (“Only a dozen commenters submitted a
response to the SEC’s invitation to address the proposal, all of them defense law-
yers or business groups.  Their universal theme: It’s progress that the SEC has rec-
ognized flaws in its administrative proceedings but the agency’s proposals don’t
come close to fixing the problem.”).
146. See Amendments to the Commission’s Rules of Practice, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-78319, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CK8Z-F9Q7].
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proceedings.”147  According to the SEC’s press release, “the Commission
adopted final amendments that, among other things” seek to:
[e]xtend the potential length of the prehearing period from the
current four months to a maximum of 10 months for the cases
designated for the longest timelines[,]
[a]llow parties in the cases designated for the longest timelines
the right to notice three depositions per side in single-respon-
dent cases and five depositions per side in multi-respondent
cases, and to request an additional two depositions[,]
[c]larify the types of dispositive motions that may be filed at vari-
ous stages of proceedings and the applicable procedures and le-
gal standards for the motions [and]
[m]ake additional clarifying and conforming changes to other
rules, including rules regarding the admissibility of certain types
of evidence, expert disclosures and reports, the requirements for
the contents of an answer, and procedures for appeals.148
B. Bias
Another criticism of the SEC’s system of administrative enforcement
that is intertwined with due-process concerns is that it is inherently biased
toward the SEC.149  As mentioned above, the evidentiary hearing is pre-
sided over by an employee, the ALJ, of the very agency that brought the
enforcement action, and the first level of appeal is heard by that same
agency.150  Thus, the SEC brings the action, an employee who does not
enjoy Article III’s tenure and salary protections rules on the evidence, and
the first appeal is heard by the agency.151  It is easy to see why many feel
such a system is biased against defendants.152
147. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Amendments to Rules
of Practice for Administrative Proceedings (July 13, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/
news/pressrelease/2016-142.html [https://perma.cc/63FF-QWND] (quoting
Mary Jo White, then SEC Chair).
148. Id.
149. See Gretchen Morgenson, At the S.E.C., a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-
question-of-home-court-edge.html [https://perma.cc/QXL7-NXJR].
150. See supra Part V.A.
151. For a discussion of such differences between Article III courts and ad-
ministrative tribunals, see Pfander, supra note 44.
152. See Kimberley A. Strassel, The SEC Plays Judge and Jury, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
4, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-sec-plays-judge-and-jury-
1470353410 (“Ever since the Dodd-Frank financial ‘reform,’ the SEC has been
pushing more cases toward in-house administrative-law judges.  These judges are
hired by the SEC and sit on the commission’s payroll.  They have ultimate discre-
tion over the cases they handle, and the rules severely limit discovery and deposi-
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Evidence of the SEC’s success rate for actions before its tribunals ver-
sus actions in federal court supports such bias claims.  For example, The
Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC enjoys a 90% success rate in its
own hearings but has only a 69% success rate “against defendants in fed-
eral court.”153  Likewise, the New York Times reported similar statistics re-
flecting a higher win percentage in SEC administrative hearings than in
federal court.154  The SEC’s success rate for actions brought before partic-
ular ALJs has been reported as even higher than this overall average.155
The appellate statistics from direct appeals before the SEC, meaning ap-
peals from an ALJ’s decision to the Commission itself, are equally dire for
defendants.156  In some situations, exercising this right of appeal resulted
in a worse outcome for defendants when the Commission increased the
initial penalty.157  Given these findings and the Dodd-Frank Act’s grant of
increased authority to use in-house administrative proceedings, it should
tions.  In short, President Obama’s SEC gets to sit as prosecutor, judge and jury—
and no surprise that the agency loves this setup.”).
153. See Jean Eaglesham, SEC Wins with in-House Judges, WALL ST. J. (May 6,
2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-
1430965803 (“The SEC won against 90% of defendants before its own judges in
contested cases from October 2010 through March of [2015], according to the
Journal analysis.  That was markedly higher than the 69% success the agency ob-
tained against defendants in federal court over the same period, based on SEC
data.  Going back to October 2004, the SEC has won against at least four of five
defendants in front of its own judges every fiscal year.”).
154. See Morgenson, supra note 6 (“So far this year, the S.E.C. has a better
record in federal court.  It won all four of its cases there while prevailing in four
out of five proceedings administratively, an 80 percent success rate.”).
155. See Eaglesham, supra note 153 (“[N]o defendant has escaped unscathed
before SEC Judge Cameron Elliot, the judge who heard Mr. Shapiro’s case.  In Mr.
Elliot’s four years as an SEC judge, he has found all of the 28 defendants who came
before him in contested cases liable on at least some of the charges the SEC en-
forcement arm had brought against them.  This compares to an 85% SEC win rate
in cases before another in-house judge, Carol Foelak, and 87% in cases heard by
the agency’s chief administrative law judge, Brenda Murray.”).
156. See id. (“The commissioners decided in their own agency’s favor concern-
ing 53 out of 56 defendants in appeals—or 95%—from January 2010 through this
past March, the Journal found.  Five other cases were sent back to in-house SEC
judges to reconsider . . . .  SEC officials believe appeals within the agency aren’t as
one-sided as the Journal’s analysis suggests, according to people close to the
agency.  Several appeals involved cases where the underlying conduct wasn’t in
dispute, such as appeals of industry bans.  Stripping those out, the SEC decided
appeals in its own favor 88% of the time, rather than 95%.  For comparison, U.S.
attorneys had an average win rate of 84% before federal appellate courts in the
past three fiscal years, according to Justice Department data.  That rate applies to
criminal cases, in contrast to the SEC’s civil cases.”).
157. See id. (“Defendants who appealed risked making their situations even
worse.  During the same stretch, the SEC Commissioners reduced financial sanc-
tions imposed on one defendant but increased the sanctions for seven others.”).
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not be surprising that the SEC has increased its use of in-house enforce-
ment in lieu of taking actions to federal court.158
Combined with the fact that the ALJs are SEC employees who lack
Article III’s tenure and salary protections, the SEC’s recent success rate in
administrative proceedings before ALJs versus that in federal district court
at least arouses the perception of ALJs’ possible bias toward the SEC.159  It
should also be noted that the SEC’s in-house success rate could give it
increased leverage during settlement talks with defendants.  In other
words, if the SEC threatens defendants with administrative actions, where
they enjoy a high success rate, those defendants might be more likely to
settle actions they might otherwise have contested.
These allegations of bias resulted in an internal investigation, initi-
ated on June 30, 2015, of SEC ALJs by the SEC’s Inspector General.160
The most specific claim of bias made was that of Lillian McEwen, a former
SEC ALJ who claims that she was “pressured” by Chief ALJ Brenda Murray
“to make rulings in certain ways.”161  In various news outlets, McEwen has
made claims that the SEC ALJ system was biased against defendants and
that her loyalty was “questioned” because she ruled “too often” against the
SEC.162  When interviewed by the Inspector General, Chief ALJ Murray
denied any bias and denied that she influenced the ALJ’s rulings in any
158. See id. (“The SEC brought more than four out of five of its enforcement
actions as administrative proceedings, rather than federal-court cases, in the fiscal
year ended Sept. 30.  That was up from less than half of them a decade earlier.”).
159. See Morgenson, supra note 149 (“If you get caught up in the web of an
agency investigation, you’re investigated, prosecuted and judged by agency person-
nel . . . .  Even if it doesn’t create actual bias, it doesn’t look good.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ronald J. Riccio, professor of constitutional
law at Seton Hall Law School)). But see David Zaring, Op-Ed, S.E.C.’s in-House
Judges Not Too Tough, a Review Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/09/01/business/dealbook/secs-in-house-judges-not-too-
tough-a-review-shows.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/77V9-C3VU] (“I read every de-
cision issued by the S.E.C.’s administrative law judges from the enactment of Dodd-
Frank in 2010 to March of [2015].  Graded toughly—on whether the S.E.C. re-
ceived everything it wanted from the case—the agency’s rate of success is high, but
not unblemished . . . .  Much of the agency’s success before the administrative law
judges, moreover, can be attributed to the routine nature of most of the cases filed
administratively.”); see also David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1155 (2016) (arguing SEC has authority to act in federal court or administra-
tive tribunals).
160. See generally Memorandum from Carl W. Hoecker, Inspector Gen., Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, to Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, on Interim Report
on ALJ Investigation (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/oig-
sec-interim-report-investigation-admin-law-judges.pdf [https://perma.cc/FPZ6-
BE2Q] (noting that investigation was initiated due to “heightened interest[ ] in
ongoing [SEC] administrative proceedings,” including “allegations of bias”).
161. See id. at 2–3.
162. See id. at 3 (noting statements attributed to McEwen, including “she
thought the system was slanted against defendants at times; she came under fire
from Chief ALJ Murray for finding too often in favor of defendants; Chief ALJ
Murray questioned McEwen’s loyalty to the SEC; McEwen retired as a result of
criticism; and SEC judges were expected to work on the assumption that ‘the bur-
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way.163  The investigation’s interim report, issued August 7, 2015, noted
that the Inspector General had not yet discovered any evidence of bias.164
The final report, issued January 21, 2016, indicated the same conclusion:
The OIG did not develop any evidence to support the allegations
of improper influence.  Former and current staff affiliated with
the Office of ALJs, including McEwen, stated that ALJ decisions
were made independently and free from influence of SEC Chief
ALJ Murray.  Conversely, several individuals interviewed during
this investigation indicated that Murray emphasized fairness and
independence of the Office, and some noted only systemic fac-
tors that impacted complete adjudicative independence, such as
Commission precedent and the rules of practice.165
Any defendant raising a procedural due process claim based upon
bias faces a difficult road.  The Supreme Court has held that procedural
due process requires an unbiased decision-maker at hearings.166  Moreo-
ver, this requirement has been expressly held to apply to administrative
hearings.167  However, in the context of administrative hearings, the Su-
preme Court has set the standard for lack of bias quite low.  For example,
the Supreme Court has expressly held that even when the same individuals
within an agency engage in the investigation and adjudication of a claim
against the alleged violator, this fact alone does not show sufficient bias to
violate due process.168  In administrative settings, the Supreme Court has
presumed that those adjudicating claims are unbiased, absent some partic-
ular facts that indicate greater bias than mere association with the agency,
such as a pecuniary interest in the outcome.169  Based upon this prece-
dent, broad allegations of bias based upon statistics showing that the SEC
den was on the people who were accused to show that they didn’t do what the
agency said they did’”).
163. See id. at 4.
164. See id.
165. Memorandum from Carl W. Hoecker, Inspector Gen., Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, to Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, on Final Report on ALJ
Investigation (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/Final-Report-
of-Investigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8XB-GXNZ].
166. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“A fair trial in a fair tribu-
nal is a basic requirement of due process.  Fairness of course requires an absence
of actual bias in the trial of cases.  But our system of law has always endeavored to
prevent even the probability of unfairness.”).
167. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47–48 (1974) (“This applies to admin-
istrative agencies which adjudicate as well as to courts.” (citing Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973))).
168. See id. at 47 (“The contention that the combination of investigative and
adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in admin-
istrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry.”).
169. See id. (noting absent pecuniary interest or similar interest, accusations
of bias must “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators”).
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wins more often in its administrative courts than in federal court are un-
likely to be sufficient to show bias in violation of due process.170
C. Appointments Clause
Though not a key focus of this Article—yet worthy of its own article—
another angle of opposition to the SEC’s tribunals is the argument that
the SEC’s process of appointing ALJs violates the U.S. Constitution’s Ap-
pointments Clause.171  The Appointments Clause grants the President the
power to appoint, “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” officers of
the United States, but it also allows that “Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”172
While determining exactly which government officers are subject to the
Appointments Clause can be difficult, the Supreme Court has focused on
the level of authority exercised as the test for making this determina-
tion.173  SEC ALJs are not appointed by any of the three parties specified
in the Appointments Clause, but rather by the SEC’s Office of Administra-
tive Law Judges, following candidate recommendations by the OPM.174
Thus, defendants in SEC administrative proceedings have challenged the
constitutionality of ALJs’ appointments.  Addressing such Appointments
Clause criticisms, the SEC does not take the position that its ALJs are ap-
pointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause, but rather that the
Appointments Clause does not apply because the ALJs are employees and
not inferior officers.175
In one noteworthy case, Bebo v. SEC,176 plaintiff Laurie Bebo chal-
lenged the SEC’s use of administrative tribunals on the grounds that such
tribunals do not adhere to the requirements of the Appointments
170. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1982) (noting that anal-
ysis for impartiality begins with “presumption that the hearing officers . . . are
unbiased” and party asserting bias bears burden of rebutting presumption by show-
ing some specific reason for disqualification (citations omitted)).
171. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
172. See id.
173. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (“We think that the
term ‘Officers of the United States’ . . . is a term intended to have substantive
meaning.  We think its fair import is that any appointee exercising significant au-
thority pursuant to the laws of the United States is an ‘Officer of the United
States,’ and must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed by [Section]
2, cl. 2, of that Article.”), superseded by statute as stated in McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
174. See Notice of Filing at 2, In re Timbervest, LLC, No. 3-15519 (June 4,
2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/3-15519-event-139.pdf
[https://perma.cc/82L5-VRK5] (describing appointment process for SEC ALJs).
175. See id. at 1 n.1 (“Respondent’s contention that ALJ Elliot’s hiring violated
the Appointments Clause rests on the false premise that he is an inferior constitu-
tional officer.  As the Division has explained, ALJ Elliot is an employee, not an
inferior officer.” (citation omitted)).
176. 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015).
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Clause.177  On the SEC’s motion for summary judgment, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed Bebo’s claim “for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”178  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal.179  The Seventh Circuit held that
“[i]t is ‘fairly discernible’ from the statute that Congress intended plain-
tiffs in Bebo’s position ‘to proceed exclusively through the statutory review
scheme’ set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 78y . . . .  If aggrieved by the SEC’s final
decision, Bebo will be able to raise her constitutional claims in this circuit
or in the D.C. Circuit.”180  In 2016, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari.181
Other cases, however, have yielded different outcomes at the trial
level.182  In one case, U.S. District Judge Leigh Martin May granted a
plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order against the SEC’s ad-
ministrative enforcement proceeding while she considered the plaintiff’s
argument that the SEC’s tribunals are unconstitutional.183  Among other
issues before her, Judge May addressed the plaintiff’s argument that SEC
ALJs are not employees but rather “inferior officers” whose appointments
are not in accordance with the Appointments Clause.184  She noted that
this determination “depends on the [amount of] authority” exercised by
the ALJ “in conducting [the] proceedings.”185  The judge held that the
SEC ALJs are indeed inferior officers because they possess significant au-
thority, with the ability to “take testimony, conduct trial[s], rule on the
177. See id. at 767.
178. See Bebo v. SEC, No. 15-C-3, 2015 WL 905349, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 3,
2015), aff’d, 799 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2015).
179. See Bebo, 799 F.3d at 775.
180. See id. at 767.
181. See Bebo v. SEC, 136 S. Ct. 1500 (2016).
182. See Loeb, Halper & Shapiro, supra note 129 (“So far, the lower courts
have decided these constitutional challenges inconsistently.  The D.C. Circuit has
affirmed a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction just like the Seventh Circuit did in Bebo.
A few courts in the Southern District of New York have done the same.  However,
one Southern District of New York judge went the other way, holding that the
court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, and then also finding in
favor of the petitioner and granting a preliminary injunction against the SEC en-
joining the administrative tribunal proceedings.  District courts in Georgia have
also granted preliminary injunctions halting SEC administrative proceedings.” (ci-
tations omitted)).
183. See Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated and
remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).  For a more specific discussion of Hill in
the context of the constitutional issues surrounding SEC proceedings, see Thomas
Glassman, Ice Skating up Hill: Constitutional Challenges to SEC Administrative Proceed-
ings, 16 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 47 (2016).
184. See id. at 1316–21 (noting that success of plaintiff’s Appointments Clause
argument in case rested upon whether ALJs are inferior officers).
185. See id. at 1316 (“The issue of whether the SEC ALJ is an inferior officer
or employee for purposes of the Appointments Clause depends on the authority
he has in conducting administrative proceedings.”).
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admissibility of evidence, and can issue sanctions.”186  She noted that
these powers are “nearly identical” to powers that the Supreme Court had
previously held to be “sufficient to find [special trial judges (STJ) in Tax
Court] were inferior officers.”187
The SEC argued that “Congress intended ALJs to be employees,” not
inferior officers, and thus the court should defer to Congress’s intent.188
However, the court dispensed with this argument quite quickly, explaining
that Congressional intent is always subject to the Constitution, in this case
the Appointments Clause.189  Thus, the judge held that even if Congress’s
intent was to make ALJs employees, it could not simply call them employ-
ees, allow for their appointment outside of the strictures of the Appoint-
ments Clause, and still vest them with the power of inferior officers.190
Based upon the court’s holding that ALJs are inferior officers, and be-
cause the SEC conceded that they were not appointed in accordance with
the Appointments Clause, Judge May held that the plaintiffs “ha[d] estab-
lished a likelihood of success on the merits” to justify a preliminary injunc-
tion staying the proceedings.191  After the decision, the same court issued
similar rulings enjoining SEC enforcement proceedings against Gray Fi-
nancial Group192 and Ironridge Global IV, Ltd.193
186. See id. at 1317 (“ALJs are permanent employees—unlike special mas-
ters—and they take testimony, conduct trial, rule on the admissibility of evidence,
and can issue sanctions, up to and including excluding people (including attor-
neys) from hearings and entering default.” (citing 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14, 201.180
(2016))).
187. See id. at 1318 (“Similarly, this Court concludes that the Supreme Court
in Freytag found that the STJs powers—which are nearly identical to the SEC ALJs
here—were independently sufficient to find that STJs were inferior officers.” (cit-
ing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978))).
188. See id. at 1319 (“In the SEC’s view, Congress is presumed to know about
the Appointments Clause, and it decided to have ALJs appointed through OPM
and subject to the civil service system; thus, Congress intended for ALJs to be em-
ployees according to the SEC.”).
189. See id. (“But ‘[t]he Appointments Clause prevents Congress from dis-
pensing power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients of the power to
appoint.’” (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991))).
190. See id. (“Congress may not ‘decide’ an ALJ is an employee, but then give
him the powers of an inferior officer; that would defeat the separation-of-powers
protections the Clause was enacted to protect.  The Court finds that SEC ALJs are
inferior officers.”).
191. See id. (“Because SEC ALJs are inferior officers, the [c]ourt finds Plaintiff
has established a likelihood of success on the merits on his Appointments Clause
claim.  Inferior officers must be appointed by the President, department heads, or
courts of law.  Otherwise, their appointment violates the Appointments Clause.”
(citation omitted)).
192. See Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2015),
vacated and remanded sub nom. Hill v. SEC, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016).
193. See Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. SEC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1294 (N.D. Ga.
2015), appeal filed, No. 16-10205 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2016).
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In another case, the district judge granted a preliminary injunction
against the SEC on Appointments Clause grounds.194  The court had pre-
viously given the SEC seven days “to allow the SEC the opportunity to no-
tify the Court of its intention to cure any violation of the Appointments
Clause,“ noting that the SEC ALJ’s appointments were “likely unconstitu-
tional.”195  Drawing upon Judge May’s findings in Hill, the court ruled
ALJs are inferior officers.196  Thus, their appointments must comport with
the Appointments Clause in order to be constitutional.197  Though the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Bebo v. SEC, the Court may eventually
decide the Appointments Clause issue on the merits.198
Though it is not an issue central to our recommendations, it is worth
noting that both decisions discussed above addressed a possible solution
to the Appointments Clause problem presented by SEC tribunals: having
the SEC commissioners directly appoint ALJs.199  Doing so would presum-
ably comport with the Appointments Clause because the SEC’s commis-
sioners are, indeed, the heads of a department.200  However, revising the
manner of appointing ALJs to comport with the Constitution’s mandate
could create a host of problems of its own.  Adopting the solution pro-
194. See Duka v. SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Because the
Court finds Plaintiff has demonstrated irreparable harm along with substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of her claim that the SEC has violated the Ap-
pointments Clause, the Court finds a preliminary injunction is appropriate to en-
join the SEC administrative proceeding.”), vacated and remanded, No. 15-2732 (2d
Cir. June 13, 2016).
195. See Duka v. SEC, No. 15 Civ. 357(RMB)(SN), 2015 WL 4940057, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2015).
196. See Duka, 124 F. Supp. 3d at 289–90.
197. See id. at 289 (“Under the Appointments Clause in Article II: ‘[T]he Con-
gress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
ments.’  It is well-settled that the Appointments Clause provides the exclusive
means by which inferior officers may be appointed . . . .  Therefore, as SEC [ALJs]
are inferior officers, their appointments must be made by the President, courts of
law, or department heads.” (citations omitted)).
198. See Loeb, Halper & Shapiro, supra note 129 (“With all of these divergent
outcomes, the issue very well may wind its way to the Supreme Court.  However,
the Supreme Court will probably let most of these cases play out in the lower
courts before weighing in, or at least will allow a circuit split to develop before
taking up the issue.  The earliest that could happen would be when either the
Second Circuit or the Eleventh Circuit decides the appeals pending before
them.”).
199. See Gray Fin. Grp., Inc. v. SEC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1355 (N.D. Ga.
2015) (“The Court notes that this conclusion may seem unduly technical, as the
ALJ’s appointment could easily be cured by having the SEC Commissioners issue
an appointment or preside over the matters themselves.”); see also Duka v. SEC, 124
F. Supp. 3d 287, 289, 289 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting district court’s ruling, that
appointment issue could be easily cured, and giving parties seven days to remedy
violation before issuing injunction).
200. See Free Enter. Fund, LLP v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477, 511–13 (2010) (holding SEC commissioners are heads of department for
purposes of Appointments Clause).
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posed by Judge May and Judge Berman could be seen as evidence that the
SEC’s current system of appointments is constitutionally deficient and,
thus, “call into question the outcome” of past rulings by, and current pro-
ceedings before, ALJs.201  Moreover, the same could be true for past and
present defendants in actions brought by other agencies that appoint ALJs
in the same manner used by the SEC.202
Even if the Appointments Clause problem might be easily solved, do-
ing so would not remedy the other problems addressed above.  In other
words, even if the SEC commissioners directly appointed SEC ALJs, con-
cerns about the lack of due process, problematic rules of evidence, and
bias would still be present.  As such, eliminating any Appointments Clause
problems would still leave us in a situation where legitimate procedural
problems would justify a wholesale revamping of the tribunals.  Part III
proposes various solutions Congress could enact that would remedy many
of the complaints raised about the SEC tribunal system.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Given the problems associated with the SEC’s system of in-house adju-
dication, reform is needed.  Even if the SEC resolved the Appointments
Clause issue, the other negatives of the SEC’s in-house enforcement ac-
tions justify the creation of an adjudicatory framework that lies outside of
the SEC.  Furthermore, even if the SEC revised its procedural rules to be
in line with those employed by the federal courts, challenges of bias and
concerns about the legitimacy of legal actions outside of the judicial
branch would remain.  These issues highlight the importance of the time-
honored principle that the judicial function should be separate from and
independent of the other branches of government.203  This Article ques-
tions the wisdom and constitutionality of the ALJ system as a whole on this
principle, regardless of its seeming acceptance as constitutional by fiat
based upon its convenience and long existence.204  We argue that these
separation of powers concerns are even greater in the area of securities
and financial regulation, as the key role of a financial regulator is to pre-
serve the integrity of the market so the financial system can function prop-
201. See Alison Frankel, Why the SEC Can’t Easily Solve Appointments Clause Prob-
lem with ALJs, REUTERS (June 17, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/
2015/06/17/why-the-sec-cant-easily-solve-appointments-clause-problem-with-aljs/
[https://perma.cc/M5UP-XK8K] (discussing potential negative implications to
SEC operations and cases if appointment process were changed).
202. See id. (“[I]f the SEC tacitly concedes its in-house judges were unconstitu-
tionally appointed . . . other federal agencies are also going to have to look hard at
the duties and appointment processes for their administrative law judges.”).
203. See supra Part I.A. (discussing importance of separation of powers and
independent judiciary).
204. See Pfander, supra note 44, at 775 (noting that literal reading of Constitu-
tion would not allow for non-article III judicial power and that few support such
literal reading because it seems “unthinkable to those who recognize and accept
the vast scope of the administrative state”).
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erly for all.205  Preserving market integrity requires integrity of the
regulator, as well as of the regulated.  Maintaining judicial power within
the regulator itself in such a high-stakes area undercuts the perception,
and perhaps reality, of the regulator’s integrity.
Simply because the Supreme Court has ruled that administrative
tribunals pass constitutional muster does not mean Congress is required to
create them.  There are better methods for adjudication of these disputes
that honor our well-accepted traditions and constitutional requirements of
fair trials and an independent judiciary.206  To that end, this Part proposes
several alternatives to the current system.  Though this Article advocates
chiefly for Article III federal courts of specialty jurisdiction to hear securi-
ties disputes, each of these options is preferable to the current system.
A. Basic Solutions: Utilize Existing Federal Courts
To be sure, one easy solution already exists: U.S. District Courts.  Con-
gress could simply amend the securities laws to require any SEC enforce-
ment action, or a subset of actions, such as those seeking any cease-and-
desist order or monetary penalty, to be filed in a U.S. District Court and
do away with administrative proceedings altogether.  This change would
solve constitutional issues with the current system, provide private parties
with a fair forum for enforcement litigation, and be an easy change, logis-
tically, because it takes advantage of the existing federal court system and
would not require the creation of new courts with new buildings, employ-
ees, judges, or procedural rules.  However, this solution has problems,
given the nature and volume of securities enforcement proceedings.
The SEC reports that it files a high volume of securities enforcement
cases.207  Thus, it would appear at first blush that requiring the SEC to file
all of its enforcement actions in federal court might be overwhelming due
to the volume of cases that would be added to an already backlogged sys-
tem of federal trial courts.  However, as one scholar recently noted, a
more detailed analysis of the SEC’s enforcement statistics reveals that they
205. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MITIGATING SYSTEMIC RISK: A ROLE FOR
SECURITIES REGULATORS 3 (2011), http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD347.pdf [https://perma.cc/EP2C-9ASJ] (“Securities regulators have a
key role to play in addressing systemic risk, bringing their particular perspective as
market integrity regulators . . . .  The recent financial crisis has led securities regu-
lators to put greater emphasis on systemic risk and financial stability.”).
206. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
57 (1982) (“As an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and
balances, and as a guarantee of judicial impartiality, Art. III both defines the power
and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.”).
207. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015
(Oct. 22, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-245.html [https://
perma.cc/YX3X-5G5D] (“Of the 807 enforcement actions filed in fiscal year 2015,
a record 507 were independent actions for violations of the federal securities laws
and 300 were either actions against issuers who were delinquent in making re-
quired filings with the SEC or were administrative proceedings seeking bars against
individuals based on criminal convictions, civil injunctions, or other orders.”).
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may be inflated, due to the way they are compiled.208  This study noted
that such irregularities include counting derivative “follow-on” actions in
the total number of enforcement actions,209 joining multiple defendants
in an action, and filing separate actions and bringing dual enforcement
actions,210 as the SEC may bring an enforcement action against a single
defendant in both an administrative proceeding and in district court at
the same time, depending upon the types of relief sought.211  These irreg-
ularities make it difficult to determine a true count of the SEC’s enforce-
ment activity based on their reported statistics.212  To be fair, as the study
also notes, it appears that in reporting their 2015 enforcement statistics,
the SEC attempted to take this issue into account by separating “indepen-
dent actions” and secondary-type actions from their total number of en-
forcement actions.213  While this study raises issues regarding the true
volume of enforcement actions filed by the SEC, the federal court system
remains backlogged, and an increased caseload could be problematic.214
What is perhaps a more pressing concern for this seemingly-simple
solution is the nature of the proceedings brought via administrative ac-
tions.  Many enforcement actions brought by the SEC are for strict-liability
offenses like delinquent filings for registered companies or contempt pro-
ceedings for violating previous orders.215  Many of these delinquent filings
“are ordinarily decided by default” because they are filed against shell
companies that “fail to respond to the SEC’s order instituting proceed-
ings.”216  Additionally, many administrative enforcement proceedings
have already been settled when filed, and the purpose of the filing was
208. See Velikonja, supra note 89, at 977 (arguing SEC’s enforcement statistics
are inflated due to various irregularities and actual number of unique enforce-
ment actions pursued may be lower than reported).
209. See id. at 935 (noting that many reported actions are “follow-on” actions,
or actions that are “derivative: they are ordinarily based on an injunction that the
SEC imposed in a primary enforcement action against the same offender based on
the same set of facts”).
210. See id. at 934 (“[T]he SEC sometimes joins several defendants in a single
enforcement action and at other times sues them individually.  The SEC’s practices
of filing separate or consolidated actions are not consistent over time and even
between regional offices.” (footnote omitted)).
211. See id. at 934–35 (discussing various types of relief available in various
forums, which can lead to SEC filing concurrent enforcement actions against same
defendant arising from same conduct).
212. See id. at 938 (noting 755 enforcement actions reportedly filed in 2014
actually includes 507 unique actions after “follow-on and secondary enforcement
actions are excluded”).
213. See id. at 935 n.194 (citing SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2015,
supra note 207).
214. See Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile up, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
6, 2015, 2:09 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civil-cases-pile-
up-1428343746 (discussing backlog in federal courts and noting some cases have
been delayed for years).
215. See Velikonja, supra note 89, at 969 (discussing various enforcement ac-
tions, including strict liability enforcement actions, brought by SEC).
216. See id. at 942.
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simply to obtain a monetary penalty for an already-litigated issue “now that
the SEC can obtain monetary penalties . . . in administrative proceed-
ings.”217  If a large number of administrative enforcement actions are es-
sentially uncontested, then it could be highly inefficient to require these
matters to be filed in U.S. District Courts with already crowded dockets.
The overarching point that can be drawn from this information is
that the SEC enforcement landscape is more complex than it may seem at
first blush.  There are multiple issues that would need to be considered
before the facially-simple solution of using U.S. District Courts could be
implemented.  Given these complexities, if a wholesale move to U.S. Dis-
trict Courts were made, the cure could be worse than the disease.
There is, however, another proposal for using existing U.S. District
Courts that could ameliorate many of these problems.  The Due Process
Restoration Act of 2015 introduced by Rep. Scott Garrett would give de-
fendants in SEC-enforcement proceedings essentially the right to litigate
the action in federal court.218  The mechanics of this process are that if
the SEC brings an administrative proceeding in which a cease-and-desist
order and penalty could result, the defendant has the right to “require the
[SEC] to terminate the proceeding.”219  This right must be exercised
within twenty days of the defendant’s “receiving notice of such proceed-
ing.”220  If the defendant exercises this right, the SEC would then have the
right to bring a civil action “for the same remedy that might be imposed”
in the administrative proceeding.221  The bill also raises the standard of
proof in SEC administrative proceedings to that of “clear and convincing
evidence.”222
This bill is a more nuanced approach than simply requiring all en-
forcement actions to be filed in U.S. District Courts, but it still has its
problems.  It would address the issue of default and other essentially non-
contested actions because parties that have already been previously found
liable for the conduct at issue or are otherwise not planning to contest the
SEC’s penalty presumably would have no incentive to force the SEC to file
its actions in federal court.  However, the problem previously identified
would remain—when defendants exercise their right to require the SEC
to file a civil action in federal court, more cases would be added to
crowded federal dockets.  While this would resolve the due process issue, it
might not be optimal from a regulatory standpoint because cases in
crowded federal courts may last for years.223  While we are strong advo-
cates of due process and a more literal application of Article III, that does
217. See id. at 966–67 (noting that in 2013 and 2014 “nearly three-quarters of
[issuer reporting actions filed in administrative proceedings] were settled”).
218. See H.R. 3798, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
219. See id. § 2(a).
220. See id.
221. See id. § 2(b).
222. See id. § 2(c).
223. See Palazzolo, supra note 214.
36
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss1/7
2017] A CALL FOR REFORM 297
not mean the SEC does not serve a valuable enforcement purpose and
needs the ability to police our financial markets efficiently within the con-
stitutional strictures of Article III.  Thus, we submit that merely requiring
the SEC to file more or all actions in U.S. District Courts is not the optimal
solution to this problem.  Fortunately, our Constitution is quite flexible
and allows for other creative methods for addressing this problem.
B. Create One or More Article III Trial Courts of Specialty Jurisdiction
Our preferred alternative to the SEC’s system of in-house enforce-
ment actions is the creation of one or more Article III trial courts of spe-
cialty jurisdiction.224  Congress clearly has such authority under Article III
and has exercised it.225  Such courts would have the power to hear cases
arising only under federal securities laws.  As such, these would be courts
of limited jurisdiction.  Like the judges and justices of all Article III courts,
judges of these securities courts would enjoy Article III’s tenure and salary
protections.
For several reasons, moving federal securities cases exclusively to Arti-
cle III courts makes sense.  First, such a change would solve any separation
of powers issues the current system creates.  Though the current U.S. ad-
ministrative state is firmly established and its system of administrative adju-
dication has been repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court,226 some still
object to the exercise of judicial power outside of the judicial branch.
Moving all securities-based cases to the judicial branch dispenses with such
concerns.
A second reason for creating specialty courts for federal securities
cases, and a natural follow-up to the first, is that clear separation of powers
lends itself to greater judicial independence.  No longer would the adjudi-
cators be employees of the SEC, thus removing a significant concern about
judicial bias.  Lifetime tenure and salary protection would largely elimi-
nate any actual, potential, or perceived pressure to side with the SEC.
While it is true that bias toward the SEC could still be present for a particu-
lar judge—based on, for example, his or her past employment and/or
ideology—such bias would not be present simply due to the way the system
is structured currently, with ALJs employed by the very agency that brings
enforcement actions before them and hears appeals of their decisions.
224. For ease of reading, the authors will refer in this Section to “courts.”
Though the Section outlines a plan for creating a single court of specialty jurisdic-
tion, the authors use “courts” to refer to both the single- and multiple-court
options.
225. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that Congress may “from time to time
ordain and establish” inferior courts); see also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 251 (2012) (creating
Article III court of specialty jurisdiction U.S. Court of International Trade).
226. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 566 (1933) (noting judi-
cial power has been exercised validly outside of Article III from very early period of
American history).
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A third justification for federal securities courts involves the volume
and nature of securities cases.  A system of trial courts devoted exclusively
to an area of law that produces so many cases—cases that are often highly
technical and complex—would lead to greater fairness, as well as greater
procedural efficiency and consistency.  Defendants facing suits in securi-
ties courts would know their cases are being heard by judges who special-
ize in the subject matter and have tenure and salary protection.  Moreover,
specialty courts operating under the same rules of evidence and proce-
dure would lead to much greater procedural certainty for litigants.  The
issues surrounding differing rules of evidence and procedure highlighted
above would be solved, and defendants would come closer to being on the
same playing field.  This arrangement is certainly preferable to the current
system, where defendants are given fewer protections in the SEC’s tribunal
system than in federal court and some defendants face action in federal
court, while others face action within the SEC.227  Given the flexibility that
the Constitution allows Congress in creating inferior courts, there are nu-
merous ways to structure such courts.
1. Creation of a Single-Location, Specialty-Jurisdiction Trial Court
One option is to create a single federal trial court devoted exclusively
to all federal securities cases, meaning both enforcement actions brought
by the SEC and actions between private litigants under the securities laws.
A blueprint for such a court exists in the U.S. Court of International Trade
(USCIT).228  Formerly the U.S. Customs Court, the USCIT was created by
Congress via the Customs Court Act of 1980.229  As a specialized trial court
created pursuant to Article III, the USCIT’s judges are appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, and they enjoy tenure and salary
protection.230  The court is composed of nine judges and is located in
New York City, and appeals from decisions of the USCIT are heard by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, with any subsequent appeals
heard by the Supreme Court.231  Thus, as the term “specialty trial court”
suggests, the court functions like a U.S. District Court, but only for certain
types of claims involving international trade.232
227. See Michael Dvorak, Note, SEC Administrative Proceedings and Equal Protec-
tion “Class of One” Challenges: Evaluating Concerns About SEC Forum Choices, 2015
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1195, 1200–10 (discussing recent equal protection challenges
made against SEC based upon seemingly “arbitrary” decisions regarding which
cases are brought before administrative proceedings and which are brought in fed-
eral court).
228. See U.S. CT. OF INT’L TRADE, About the Court, http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/
AboutTheCourt.html [https://perma.cc/65Y4-DH24] (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
229. See Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980).
230. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 251–252 (2012).
231. See About the Court, supra note 228.
232. See Lynn S. Baker & Michael E. Roll, Securing Judicial Review in the United
States Court of International Trade: Has Conoco, Inc. v. United States Broadened the
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If created as a single-location court, this Article proposes naming the
court the U.S. Securities Court (USSC) and that the court be sited in ei-
ther New York City or Washington, D.C., with a set number of judges,
including a chief judge.233  As is the norm for cases before the USCIT,
cases before the USSC would be heard by a single judge.234  Decisions of
the USSC would be appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit and, subsequently, to the Supreme Court.  Benefits of siting
the USSC in a single location include the logistical efficiencies and finan-
cial savings that would come with a small number of judges in a single
location, versus many more judges spread throughout the country.
Of course, there are also costs associated with a single court in one
geographical location.  The SEC’s cases involve actions against defendants
from all over the country and the world, so litigating enforcement actions
in a single location could be burdensome to some litigants.  However, this
burden is no higher than that currently imposed by administrative pro-
ceedings.  The SEC Office of Administrative Law Judges is currently lo-
cated in Washington, D.C.235  However, when it conducts hearings, it has
the authority to hold them in locations convenient for the parties and
witnesses involved.236  Because the USCIT has a single location, it has simi-
lar authority for judges to hold trials in other locations more convenient
to the litigants.237  With modern motions practice, communication tech-
nology to aid in handling pre-trial hearings, and the ability of the judges to
hold trials in convenient locations across the United States when neces-
Jurisdictional Boundaries?, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 726, 727–31 (1995) (discussing
subject matter jurisdiction of USCIT over various international trade matters).
233. Like the USCIT, which is located in New York City, the proposed court
could consist of nine judges, or some other number.  Due to the volume of SEC
actions against defendants, a higher number of judges would likely be needed.
Regardless of the number of judges, the authors recommend that one of the
judges serve as chief judge, as is the case with the USCIT.
234. See 28 U.S.C. § 254 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in section 255
of this title, the judicial power of the Court of International Trade with respect to
any action, suit or proceeding shall be exercised by a single judge, who may pre-
side alone and hold a regular or special session of court at the same time other
sessions are held by other judges.”).
235. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INSTRUCTIONS FOR PRO SE RESPONDENTS 1,
https://www.sec.gov/alj/alj-instructions-for-respondents.pdf [https://perma.cc/
375N-KPAE] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017) (noting address for SEC’s Office of Ad-
ministrative Law Judges in Washington D.C. and requiring filings to be mailed
there).
236. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.200 (c) (2016) (“The time and place for any hearing
shall be fixed with due regard for the public interest and the convenience and
necessity of the parties, other participants, or their representatives.”).
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 256(a) (2012) (“The chief judge may designate any judge
or judges of the court to proceed, together with necessary assistants, to any port or
to any place within the jurisdiction of the United States to preside at a trial or
hearing at the port or place.”).
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sary, a single-location Article III securities court should not be any more
inconvenient than the current system.238
In fact, under this proposal, much of the current structural system
could be maintained with relatively basic modifications to comply with Ar-
ticle III.  As SEC ALJs are currently housed in Washington, D.C., that loca-
tion could be maintained.  The appointments process could be modified
to require presidential appointment of the judges with advice and consent
of the Senate239 and with lifetime tenure and salary protection.240  Thus,
the accusations of bias against the SEC would be resolved, as the adjudica-
tor would have gone through the same process as any other federal judge.
To resolve the procedural deficiencies alleged against the SEC, Con-
gress could require the creation of, or create, new rules of procedure that
would be used in these courts.241  Thus, for example, for certain violations
that tend to be non-contested, such as strict-liability filing offenses, lesser
procedures that more closely match the current procedures could be
crafted to allow for relatively expedited hearings.  For more serious viola-
tions that require proof of mens rea or could result in steep monetary pen-
alties or cease-and-desist orders, more robust procedures similar to, or the
same as, those required in other federal courts could be used.  As long as
any such requirements meet relatively loose due process requirements,
Congress is free to tailor these procedures to make the hearings of actions
under the securities laws efficient yet fair.242
One potential impediment to efficiency in these courts would be the
right to a jury trial.  The Supreme Court has held that the Seventh Amend-
ment’s right to trial by jury applies differently in Article III courts than it
does in non-Article III courts, such as administrative proceedings like the
238. It is also worth noting that a significant number of administrative pro-
ceedings never go to a hearing.  The SEC reports that in fiscal year 2015, 207 initial
decisions were made, but only 27 hearings were held. See Office of Administrative
Law Judges, supra note 73.  In 2013 and 2014, nearly 75% of unique issuer report-
ing administrative actions filed by the SEC were settled. See Velikonja, supra note
89, at 966–67.  If a similar rate of settlement or disposition without trial continues
to hold true, most enforcement actions would not require a hearing or trial, ame-
liorating any location burden.  Of course, it could be possible that the rate of set-
tlement was this high because parties wished to avoid going before an
administrative proceeding where they felt they would not receive fair treatment, as
opposed to a judicial trial.
239. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
240. See id. art. III, § 1.
241. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651–2113 (2012) (providing various rules of
procedure for federal courts, some of which are mandatory and others which may
be modified by Supreme Court with approval of Congress).
242. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexi-
ble and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands.”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) (“A procedural rule that may
satisfy due process in one context may not necessarily satisfy procedural due pro-
cess in every case.  Thus, procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may
not suffice to try a felony charge.” (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270–71
(1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963))).
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SEC’s tribunals.243  Under this line of reasoning, cases involving public
rights that might require a jury trial if adjudicated in an Article III court
do not require a jury trial if held in an administrative tribunal.244  Among
the type of claims that the Supreme Court has found require a jury trial in
an Article III court, but not in an administrative proceeding, are those
seeking civil monetary penalties.245  Thus, though the SEC currently can
pursue monetary penalties without a jury in an administrative setting,
under our proposal to require such proceedings to be filed in federal
court, a right to trial by jury would exist.246  In other words, though Article
I tribunals involving statutory violations leading to civil penalties can con-
stitutionally be held without a jury, the creation of our proposed specialty-
jurisdiction Article III court would come with the right to a jury for these
same cases.
While this may seem a detriment to some, because a jury trial cer-
tainly would slow down some proceedings, it may come as a benefit of this
Article’s recommendation.  A jury trial is an important protection for de-
fendants.  This Article submits, as other commentators have, that if the
SEC is seeking civil penalties, it should be required to convince a jury of
the liability of the defendant.247  Any loss in efficiency due to a jury-trial
requirement is more than made up for by the important rights jury trials
provide defendants.  Additionally, it is questionable how much an increase
jury trials would impede enforcement efficiency, given that the large num-
ber of actions the SEC files that are either not contested or settled.248
Further, if a single-location, specialty-jurisdiction court is deemed too
inconvenient to replace the current system, the court’s jurisdiction could
243. See Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 460–61 (1977) (“Thus, history and our cases support the
proposition that the right to a jury trial turns not solely on the nature of the issue
to be resolved but also on the forum in which it is to be resolved.”).
244. See id. at 455 (“[W]hen Congress creates new statutory ‘public rights,’ it
may assign their adjudication to an administrative agency with which a jury trial
would be incompatible, without violating the Seventh Amendment’s injunction
that jury trial is to be ‘preserved’ in ‘suits at common law’ . . . .  This is the case
even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudica-
tion of those rights is assigned instead to a federal court of law instead of an ad-
ministrative agency.”).
245. See id. at 450 (noting Congress’ ability to create statutory obligations and
provide for monetary penalties for violations in administrative proceedings). But
see Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 420 (1987) (holding that Seventh Amend-
ment requires jury trial when government seeks monetary penalties for violation of
regulatory statute in federal court).
246. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 420.
247. See Suja A. Thomas & Mark Cuban, Op-Ed, A Jury, Not the S.E.C., N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/17/business/
dealbook/a-jury-not-the-sec.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/JMR7-5FVR] (discussing
challenges to SEC tribunals and noting “[m]any of the challenges, such as one
brought by the private equity financier Lynn Tilton, focus on matters that do not
go to the heart of the issue.  The real issue is an individual’s right to a jury trial”).
248. See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
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be modified to allow more flexibility.  For example, rather than granting
exclusive jurisdiction, Congress could grant the court a level of jurisdic-
tion more akin to concurrent jurisdiction, whereby the SEC must first file
claims in the USSC, but the defendant could have the case transferred to a
local U.S. District Court.  This right of transfer could be structured as
mandatory or upon the discretion of the judge.  For private litigants bring-
ing securities claims, the right could be given in the opposite direction:
plaintiffs could be allowed to bring claims under the securities laws in U.S.
District Courts but with the right of defendants to file a motion for trans-
fer to the USSC.  Because such jurisdictional arrangements would not re-
move a federal case from federal jurisdiction, but would simply allocate it
to different federal courts, this structure would be well within Congress’s
Article I powers.249
2. Creation of Multiple Specialty-Jurisdiction Trial Courts
As another option, instead of creating a single-location court, the
USSC could be situated among the federal districts, with a single securities
court in each district, similar to U.S. Bankruptcy Courts.250  Notably, U.S.
Bankruptcy Courts are not Article III courts because bankruptcy judges do
not have lifetime tenure or salary protection.251  Under this Article’s pro-
posal, these specialty-jurisdiction trial courts would follow Article III’s ap-
pointment, tenure, and salary-protection requirements.252  Benefits of
placing the courts throughout the country, as opposed to in a single loca-
tion, include convenience of the parties—chiefly defendants but also any
witnesses for either party—to litigation.  Having a securities court in each
federal district would also lessen the workload of the securities judges na-
tionwide.  As with the previous recommendation of a single-location, spe-
cialty-jurisdiction court, Congress could tailor procedures and
jurisdictional requirements to make these courts efficient yet fair.253
While there are some convenience-based benefits to this option, the
costs and logistics associated with creating a securities trial court for each
of the nation’s ninety-four federal districts254 are certainly not preferable
compared to the costs and logistics of creating a single-location securities
249. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 56, at 1160–64 (discussing both broad
and narrow theories of Congressional power over Article III courts, but under ei-
ther theory Congress is allowed to create inferior court and allocate jurisdiction
over different disputes amongst them).
250. See FED. JUD. CTR., Bankruptcy Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/history/
home.nsf/page/courts_special_bank.html [https://perma.cc/3HJC-PFP6] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2017) (discussing structure of U.S. Bankruptcy Courts).
251. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2012) (providing that bankruptcy judges serve
terms of fourteen years and are “judicial officers” of district courts in which they
serve).
252. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
253. See supra Part III.B.1.
254. See 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012) (setting forth judicial districts of U.S. court
system).
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court, or creating a securities trial court for each of the nation’s twelve
federal circuits (excluding the Federal Circuit).255  By spreading all securi-
ties cases among ninety-four judges, the burden on each judge with re-
spect to the judge’s caseload would certainly be diminished.  However, it is
doubtful that there would be a sufficient amount of securities litigation to
justify an Article III securities judge in each judicial district.  Even if the
judges are allocated to each appellate circuit, some circuits cover a geo-
graphical area that does not lend itself to significant securities litiga-
tion.256  Thus, as an alternative, an Article III securities judge could be
placed in the judicial districts in which the SEC headquarters and regional
offices reside.257  Counting the SEC headquarters in Washington, D.C.,
this would bring the total number of judgeships to twelve and would en-
sure that the securities judges are housed near the enforcement arms of
the SEC.258  As under this Article’s proposal for a single-location court,
cases would be heard by a single judge.
Appeals would be filed with the geographically appropriate U.S.
Court of Appeals, meaning the circuit in which the trial court is located.
Alternatively, appeals could be directed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, as are appeals from the USCIT.259  For practical rea-
sons, notably the volume of federal securities cases and the convenience of
defendants, the authors prefer the former option.
3. Specialty-Jurisdiction Trial Courts with Broad Financial Jurisdiction
One potential argument against the practicality of specialty-jurisdic-
tion securities courts, whether employing a single-location court or courts
throughout the country, is that while the volume of securities litigation in
the U.S. is significant, it is not sufficient to justify the creation of its own
courts.  This Article argues that replacing only the existing ALJ structure
with Article III-compliant judges and more robust processes would not
greatly increase the cost of maintaining the current ALJ office.  Thus, this
objection should not serve as a bar to the first recommendation.  It is a
more compelling objection to the creation of multiple specialty-jurisdic-
tion courts.  Nevertheless, anticipating this objection, a novel way to ad-
dress this issue is to allow the specialty courts proposed to have jurisdiction
over a much larger swath of federal financial regulation.
255. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (setting forth judicial circuits of U.S. court
system).
256. See id.  For example, the Eight Circuit covers “Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.” See id.  While there is cer-
tainly some securities litigation in this circuit, it pales in comparison to the Second
Circuit, which contains New York, a hub of international finance.
257. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC Addresses: Headquarters and Regional Offices,
https://www.sec.gov/contact/addresses.htm [https://perma.cc/PJ8U-SE7E] (last
visited Jan. 21, 2017) (setting forth SEC regional offices).
258. See id.
259. See About the Court, supra note 228.
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In the wake of the sub-prime lending crisis, the federal financial regu-
latory focus has shifted to “addressing systemic risk,” also referred to as a
“macroprudential” regulatory focus.260  Former Federal Reserve Chair-
man Ben Bernanke has broadly defined systemic risk as “developments
that threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole and conse-
quently the broader economy, not just that of one or two institutions.”261
This shift occurred due to the lesson learned in the sub-prime crisis: that
seemingly unrelated risk taking or regulatory failures can threaten finan-
cial stability because of the highly interconnected nature of our markets
and financial institutions.262  To address this systemic risk, Dodd-Frank
created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to bring to-
gether various federal financial regulatory agencies and coordinate their
efforts to “constrain excessive risk in the financial system.”263  The SEC is a
member of the FSOC, along with the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency (FHFA), National Credit Union Administration (NCRUA),
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Treasury Department, and
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).264  Because these
agencies are required to coordinate their efforts to manage the stability of
260. See Miriam F. Weismann, Jason H. Peterson & Christopher A. Buscaglia,
The New Macroprudential Reform Paradigm: Can It Work?, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1029,
1033 (2014) (citing Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address
Before the 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 5,
2011)) (discussing change in regulatory focus to macroprudential concerns after
passage of Dodd-Frank Act).
261. See Corey Boles, Bernanke Offers Broad Definition of Systemic Risk, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 18, 2009, 12:23 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2009/11/18/
bernanke-offers-broad-definition-of-systemic-risk.
262. See Nellie Liang, Systemic Risk Monitoring and Financial Stability, 45 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 129, 130 (2013) (“The recent financial crisis demon-
strates vividly that there are many channels through which seemingly small losses
can become systemic and threaten financial stability.  Systemic risk arises when
shocks are amplified and inflict significant damage on the broader financial system
and broader economy.”); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk and Global Economic Architecture:
Why Full Financial Integration May Be Undesirable, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 388, 388
(2010) (noting that integration of financial markets has led to systemic risk and
that “in the absence of appropriate government intervention, privately profitable
transactions may lead to systemic risk”).
263. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Financial Stability Oversight Council: About
FSOC, http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/ESJ3-MJMD] (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (“The Financial Stability
Oversight Council has a clear statutory mandate that creates for the first time col-
lective accountability for identifying risks and responding to emerging threats to
financial stability.  It is a collaborative body chaired by the Secretary of the Trea-
sury that brings together the expertise of the federal financial regulators, an inde-
pendent insurance expert appointed by the President, and state regulators.”).
264. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, Financial Stability Oversight Council: FSOC
Member Agencies, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/FSOC-
Member-Agencies.aspx [https://perma.cc/K7D5-E9FN] (last visited Jan. 21,
2017).
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our financial system and guard against systemic risk, it would be a natural
fit for the specialty-jurisdiction courts proposed in this Article to be given
jurisdiction to hear disputes arising from the actions of all of these
agencies.
Not every one of these agencies administers a statutory scheme that
requires filing civil enforcement actions or provides for civil suits to be
brought by private parties.  But for those that do, the jurisdiction of the
specialty-jurisdiction court proposed could be expanded to include their
respective actions in the same way the authors recommend with respect to
the SEC.  This recommendation would provide litigants under those regu-
latory schemes with an efficient but fair court to hear these disputes,
rather than being forced into administrative proceedings.  Additionally,
the judges in these courts would have or develop expertise in financial
matters and the implementation of these statutes and, thus, would pre-
sumably be able to adjudicate complex financial disputes better.
Such a court system would resolve the potential objection previously
raised that a court that heard only securities disputes would not have a
sufficient caseload to justify its existence, and it would also have other ben-
efits.  First, it would allow those regulated by all of the above-mentioned
agencies to have the constitutional protection of the Article III judicial
process proposed in this Article, not just those regulated by the SEC.  Ad-
ditionally, because these agencies are called to coordinate their efforts
under the FSOC, a subject-matter-specific, specialty-jurisdiction court
might aid them in doing so.  The expert judges of these specialty courts
would likely give better rulings in complex financial cases, and if the same
appellate court hears all appeals, the potential for conflicting precedent is
lessened.  Finally, because systemic risk and financial-system integrity are
increasingly important regulatory issues, such a court system would signal
to the financial markets and the public a commitment to both rigorous
regulation and fair procedures for the regulated.
Each of these approaches rectifies the problem of the SEC’s adminis-
trative tribunals and provides an independent Article III judiciary in an
area of law of national importance.  For practical reasons, the most reason-
able approach is a single-location Article III court, located in Washington,
D.C., or New York City.  As long as this court is staffed with a sufficient
number of judges with the ability to travel and hold court in other loca-
tions for purposes of convenience, this approach would likely be the most
cost-effective way to replace the SEC’s ALJs with Article III judges.
Whether given jurisdiction over only securities law disputes or over the
expanded range of FSOC suits, this court would serve a critically impor-
tant function as a properly established federal court with financial exper-
tise.  This proposal addresses the constitutional concerns currently being
raised in SEC administrative tribunals and aids in the development and
protection of our system of financial regulation.265
265. See supra Part II.
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CONCLUSION
For decades, the SEC has pursued cases against defendants via both
federal courts and in-house enforcement proceedings.  Over time, the
SEC’s authority to employ the latter has expanded, and it significantly in-
creased pursuant to new powers granted to the SEC by Dodd-Frank.  As
the SEC has increased its use of enforcement actions in SEC tribunals,
opposition to tribunals has grown louder, as have calls for reform.
We believe the time for wholesale reform has come.  The allegations
being levied against the SEC, whether always accurate are not, are merely
proof of the importance of an independent judiciary, as enshrined in our
Constitution.  The SEC’s recent success rate in tribunals, relative to its win
rate in federal courts, is not the problem.  Rather, it is a symptom of the
problem.  The real problem is the very use of tribunals for cases that
should be heard solely by Article III courts, particularly when such tribu-
nals do not provide defendants the important due process protections
provided by federal courts.  However, simply adding a fuller range of pro-
cedural protections to tribunal hearings does not address the root prob-
lem—a judicial process that does not belong outside of the federal
judiciary in the first place.
Our nation’s Founding Fathers created a country whose government
was built on the notion that the separate branches of government should
possess certain powers and that those powers should be protected against
encroachment by the other branches.  Coincident with this notion, our
Founders believed in an independent judicial branch that possessed com-
plete judicial power, free to rule on matters of federal law without unlaw-
ful incursions by any other branch of government.  Nevertheless, over
time, Congress has often placed certain judicial powers outside of the judi-
cial branch and into the hands of federal administrative agencies.  The
Supreme Court has willingly played along, frequently putting its imprima-
tur on various non-Article III tribunals’ possession of such power.  As a
result, the federal administrative state’s possession of judicial functions is
now firmly entrenched in our system of government.
However, although our country has done something for a long period
of time, this does not mean it is legitimate or wise to do so.  While the
Supreme Court has routinely approved of transfers of judicial powers,
such transfers are not necessarily right or binding on Congress in structur-
ing administrative agencies.  In the view of the authors of this Article, the
recent accusations against the SEC exemplify this encroachment on judi-
cial power reaching a boiling point, and it is time to reverse course.  The
proposals discussed in this Article provide for doing so.  In particular, the
proposal for a single-location Article III securities or FSOC-based court is a
sensible, cost-effective way to restore integrity and fairness to a fundamen-
tally broken judicial process.
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